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Abstract 
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Purpose:  The purpose with this thesis is to study whether diversity in board of 
directors in Swedish Large Cap firms will create better financial 
performance in the company.  
 
Methodology:  The study applies a deductive approach and a quantitative 
investigation where the level of diversity in the board of directors of 
54 Swedish Large Cap firms is studied relative to the company 
performance. 
 
Theoretical perspectives:  Resource dependence theory, agency theory, theories about team 
work and previous studies about diversity and company performance. 
The institutional perspectives the Swedish corporate governance 
code and the Folksam kompetensindex 2010 report have been 
regarded. 
 
Empirical foundation:  The empirical foundation consists of data for 54 Swedish Large Cap 
firms during the years 2005 to 2010. 
 
Conclusions:  The study could not show any results of statistical significance when 
comparing the Folksam diversity index with the performance 
measures return on assets and market-to-book value. Throughout the 
study weaknesses in the construction of the diversity index have been 
identified
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1. Introduction 
The following chapter presents the background to the study and why the study is up to date. In 
addition, it presents the problem statement and purpose, limitations and target audience. The 
chapter ends with a description of the disposition of the thesis.  
1.1 Background 
In the mid-19
th
 century a core concept of the corporations we see today were created. The 
concept was the incorporation of a legal entity separated from the owners of the firm. This legal 
entity had many of the rights of a real person such as to enter into contracts, to sue and be sued 
and to own property. The corporations had a life of their own and the owners’ liability for the 
company was limited to their equity investment. Still, ownership was the basis of power. To 
exercise their power shareholders elected directors for the company’s board who reported to 
them.
1
 
 
In the early years of the 20
th
 century the history of corporations saw another major development 
in the process of becoming what they are today. In economically advancing countries the stock of 
many corporations were now listed on stock exchanges. This resulted in more shareholders for 
each specific company and shareholders that were spread geographically. The links between 
management and owners became remote and power was shifted from the owners to the 
managers.
2
 
 
During the second half of the 20
th
 century several things changed the way corporations and 
boards are looked upon. The importance of independent outside directors rose in the 1970s. In 
the same time audit committees were introduced and the debate increased about board duties to 
other stakeholders than shareholders. During the 1980s the directors’ responsibility to increase 
shareholder-value grew strong but several failures made the downsides with this thinking 
                                               
1
 Tricker (2009) 
2
 Tricker (2009) 
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apparent in the later part of the 1980s. This was also the time when the concept of corporate 
governance came into focus. In the 1990s major institutional investors changed their way of 
thinking and became pro-active in their contact with the corporations which led to an increased 
focus on the share price performance. The first corporate governance reports where produced 
around the world and put a lot of focus on the potential abuse of corporate power. However, one 
Australian report broadened the focus to include both performance and conformance stating that: 
“the board’s key role is to ensure that corporate management is continuously and effectively 
striving for above-average performance, taking account for risk” and “this is not to deny the 
board’s additional role with respect to shareholder protection”.3 
 
In the last decade we have seen an increased focus on the diversity of the top tiers in co-
operations and especially the distribution between the genders. This discussion has often been 
loud. In some countries, such as Norway, the distribution between the genders in the board of 
directors has even been legislated
4
. The question is, does diversity in board of directors really 
matter? 
1.2 Problem discussion 
In our education at Lund University we have studied organizations from many different aspects. 
During the Master studies at the Corporate and Financial Management programme our key field 
of interest has become how to create good performance in corporations. Performance is a broad 
word and we have, during our studies, got many different aspects on what good performance is 
and how to achieve it. We have found particular interest in how the boards of directors influence 
the company and how they could be one of the key factors to good performance. What has struck 
us during our studies is the high level of homogeneity in the boards of directors. From what we 
have seen they consist of men in the fifties with an exam in economics or engineering and most 
of the time they seem to have the same cultural background. 
 
During 2010 the Swedish mutual insurance company Folksam released a competence report that 
investigated the diversity in board of directors and top management in listed Swedish firms and 
                                               
3
 Tricker (2009) p 10-14 
4
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ranked these after the level of diversity. What was found interesting in this report is that the 
competence ranking is made after how diversified the boards and top management are, 
insinuating that the competence was only dependent on the level of diversity. The author 
Lundberg Markow argues that corporations must understand the norms and values in society and 
adapt the operations to fit these norms and values to be fully successful. Further, she argues that, 
to be successful in this work, companies cannot limit the competence and ignore the benefits of 
diversity.
5
 This leads to the question if a board of directors with a low level of diversity can be as 
competent as a board with a very high level of diversity.  
 
Many factors come into play when talking about success in companies but the intention here is to 
narrow the perspective to diversity in board of directors, more specifically the four variables; age, 
tenure, education and gender. The usual factor to look at in these kind of studies are gender, a 
topic that has been discussed, investigated and even legislated in some countries. We intend to 
take diversity one step further and use the Folksam index, which is looking at the variables stated 
above, and compare it to financial performance. Our hope is that this will give a better picture of 
how diversified the board is.  
 
The result of the diversity index will be compared with key financial ratios to see if diversified 
boards perform better than less diversified boards. There are many ratios to look at when 
evaluating the financial success of firms. One could look at cash flow measures, balance sheet 
measures or profitability measures. All come with benefits and disadvantages and many of them 
demand adjustments. For this study the performance measures return on assets and market-to-
book value have been chosen because they are easy to replicate and require few adjustments.  
1.3 Problem statement 
Does diversity regarding gender, age, education and tenure in board of directors in Swedish 
Large Cap companies create better financial performance in terms of market-to-book value and 
return on assets? 
                                               
5
 Lundberg Markow (2010) 
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1.4 Purpose 
The intention with this thesis is to study whether diversity in board of directors in Swedish Large 
Cap firms will create better financial performance in the company and hence better results. To 
achieve this, the diversity index is compared with the key financial ratios return on assets and 
market-to-book value. The aim is to provide a guide to whether diversity is something to strive 
for in terms of financial performance.  
1.5 Limitation and demarcation 
The study focuses on Swedish firms listed on the NASDAQ OMX Nordic Large Cap (54 firms) 
as these companies, to a larger extent, are in stable growth and can give good historical 
information about themselves. This improves the accuracy of the study and will give a more 
comparable result. It should be noted that this is also a limitation since the sample size is 
decreased.  
 
The study is also limited in the number of parameters to look at when it comes to diversity. The 
parameters are age, gender, education and tenure. The parameters have been limited to these four 
for two reasons; to be able to compare the results with the Folksam index and due to limitations 
in finding accurate information on other parameters. This is a limitation in the study; the index 
does not capture the full level of diversity of the boards. The study will for example, totally 
disregard the cultural aspects of diversification that could create both benefits but also problems 
within an organization and a board. As an example, Millicom got a very low education score 
because the only academic studies undertaken was economics. On the other hand, Millicom’s 
board has representation from several nationalities and cultural background which is a kind of 
diversity that is not captured in this study.  
 
In the study there is also a demarcation regarding the performance parameters looked at and thus 
it could fail to cover the full spectrum of the word performance. A company may very well 
perform extraordinary when it comes to capture market shares and selling their product but still 
perform very poor financials. As an example, a high-tech start-up would probably bleed 
financially but could show very good growth on the market and good future financials. This start-
13 
 
up would show up as a poor performing company in the study due to the fact that performance is 
narrowed down to return on assets and market-to-book value. To limit this problem the study 
only focuses on Swedish firms on the NASDAQ OMX Nordic Large Cap where there are few 
young, high growth companies and thus the findings in our study should be comparable.  
 
In the study the top management has been disregarded, thus the study only looks at the board of 
directors. It is a limitation in the study as the top management is often the ones that take the 
managerial decisions in a company. On the other hand the strategic decisions are made in the 
board of directors or at least in conjunction with the board of directors and thus the study should 
be able to capture if a diversified board does better strategic decision making than less diversified 
boards. To only make a study on the board of directors is a demarcation chosen because of the 
blurry information on which people that are actually included in the top management. What 
people that sit in the board of directors is clear and this demarcation should thus make the study 
easier to replicate. 
1.6 Target audience 
The target group of the study is those with basic knowledge and interest within corporate finance 
and corporate governance. Previous studies within the field is beneficial to fully take capture in 
the meaning of the result but one might just as well read this study and get a basic understanding 
of it without great academic knowledge.  
  
14 
 
1.7 Disposition 
 
Research 
methodology 
•Chapter two explains the research methodology used in the study. A discussion is held 
regarding the research approach and the validity and reliability of the study. Further, 
criticism of the research method is brought forward 
Theory  
•This chapter will state and discuss what theories that define the area of the survey. 
Namely it will describe the role of the board and the Swedish corporate governance 
code. Further it will describe the board composition, reasons for managing diversity in 
the board, resource dependence theory and the agency theory. 
Hypothesis  
•The hypothesis that has been used in the survey will be defined and the background 
to why it is tested will be stated. 
Empirical 
approach  
•In this chapter the empirical approach will be defined and explained. The work 
process and problems that appeared in the work are presented. Further, other 
variables that could affect the result are stated. 
Results  
•Here the results will be presented and explained. All different variables will be 
discussed with focus on the diversity index. 
Analysis  
•In the seventh chapter the results of the statistical test are analysed in relation to the 
presented theories. 
Conclusion  
•The conclusion of the study is presented to fulfill the purpose of the study. 
Suggestions for further research and recommendations regarding the diversity index 
are presented. 
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2. Research methodology 
The following chapter describes the research method and approach used in the paper. Further, 
the data collection process is described and the structure of the survey is presented. The chapter 
includes a description of both the performance measures and the diversity index used in the 
study. Finally, the statistical method is presented followed by criticism against the methodology. 
2.1 Perspective 
The perspective with this study is to show what impact diversity in the boards of directors has on 
the performance of a company. It is important to know that the study is intended to show whether 
diversified board of directors perform better than less diversified boards and will thus not be a 
guide on how to assemble a diversified board. This is important to say as it may have an impact 
on the outcome of the study. The intention is that this study should provide valuable insights 
whether diversity in board of directors increases firm performance.
6
 
2.2 Decision data 
2.2.1 Research approach 
Two different approaches could be used when implementing research studies, either through 
inductive theory or deductive theory. With an inductive approach, theory is the outcome of the 
observations and the research that has been done. In the deductive approach the relationship is 
reverse and theory precedes the observations and findings. To meet the purpose of this study the 
approach will be the deductive theory where theory leads to a hypothesis followed by data 
collection, findings and a confirmed or rejected hypothesis. Existing theory regarding diversity in 
companies will be used to create hypothesis and analyze the outcome of the research.  
 
The deductive process is fundamentally very linear as the steps follow each other. However, 
there are circumstances that may change the view of the theory during the process. These 
                                               
6
 Bryman & Bell (2007) 
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circumstances are that new theoretical ideas or findings may be published before this study is 
finished, the relevance of the collected data may become apparent only after the data have been 
collected or the data may not at all fit the original hypotheses. One downside with the deductive 
theory is that the findings may be limited and it is hard to find anything else than what the 
researcher is looking for. The intention is to keep an open mind towards all possible outcomes in 
order to fairly implement a proper study.
7
 
2.2.2 Research philosophy 
Research philosophy is the way people look upon knowledge and the two main ways to do this 
are positivism and interpretivism. With a positivistic research philosophy knowledge is seen as 
something objective with a sharp distinction between theory and research. The purpose of the 
research is to test the theory and only phenomenon’s that can be confirmed is considered to be 
real knowledge. Contrary to positivism, interpretivism states that the view of the writer 
influences the result. Knowledge is created through interaction between people and the answer 
becomes subjective.
8
  
 
The intention is to make a study that is possible to replicate. By using theories we will construct a 
hypothesis that can be tested. The results are presented without any interpretation and hence they 
are objective. Finally we will make a clear distinction between those statements that are scientific 
and those that are normative. Hence, our intention is to execute this study with a positivistic 
research philosophy. 
2.2.3 Research method 
Quantitative studies are generally empirical, in our case a statistical study. Qualitative studies, on 
the other hand, are often characterized by being more in-depth and thus good for explorative 
problems.
9
 The positive thing with the qualitative research method is that it is very flexible and 
can be used to get findings in a plethora of problems. The negative thing is that it often yields 
                                               
7
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results that are hard to replicate, have a large variance and are subject to the researchers own 
values and could thus give an inaccurate result.
10
 
 
The quantitative approach that has been used yields a more replicable result than a qualitative 
approach would have done in this subject; we have thus chosen a quantitative approach for this 
study. 
2.3 Data collection 
To answer the problem statement in this study, whether increased diversity does create better 
financial performance, secondary data is collected. The data is the base for the statistical test 
which is used to answer the hypothesis.  
2.3.1 Secondary- and primary data 
This study will solely be based on secondary data. The secondary data will mainly be our own 
study done on 54 companies on the Swedish stock exchange, OMX Nordic Large Cap. The 
performance data has been gathered via the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. The 
information about company board of directors has been gathered from the annual report on each 
company. Other secondary resources has been Bloomberg Businessweek’s executive profiles, 
this has been used to get complementary data that could not be found in the annual report. The 
database has mainly been used to gather education on the different directors when this has not 
been mentioned in the annual report.  
2.3.2 Secondary data criticism 
The Thomson Reuters Datastream database has flaws, the most obvious we have encountered is 
the problem to see what kind of adjustments that has been done to the balance sheet and income 
statement. In appendix L a test sample of five companies is found. This test shows that the 
performance measures, calculated with numbers from the annual report by the authors, do not 
differ significantly from the data provided by Datastream. The adjustments that cause the 
                                               
10
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difference have not been identified but due to the minor differences the data provided by 
Datastream is considered to be trustworthy.  
2.3.3 Validity 
A study with a high validity is a study where the empiric measurements are measured in an 
accurate way. 
11
 In our study we have used annual reports to get an independent source of 
information. Due to requirements by law, the annual reports have been reviewed by independent 
auditors which should give us an unbiased view of the variables we have chosen. The data we 
have gathered from other sources has been taken from well-known companies covering the 
financial markets and should thus have a high standard. 
 
All sources of information used to build our theoretical framework have been gathered from 
well-known researchers and writers. We have tried to use sources that are as close to present time 
as possible to get the latest information and breakthroughs within the field. This should ensure a 
high standard on the material used. 
 
To strengthen the validity even more, statistical tests have been used to see if some variables in 
the index have more influence than others, see appendix K. These tests give a good measurement 
on how well the index is built and if there is any biases in the index. It is shown that age and 
tenure is more correlated to the index than gender and education. Hence the gender and education 
variables could be argued to add more to the index than age and tenure. It should be mentioned 
though that building an index for diversity is notoriously hard as there are many variables that 
could influence how diversified a board is. To increase the validity in the study the index is built 
on variables that can easily be accessed. 
2.3.4 Reliability 
A study with a high reliability is a study that can be replicated and still show the exact same 
result.
12
 Since the study is a replica study of an earlier study made by Folksam the reliability is 
measured by comparing the calculated index with the Folksam index, this has been done in 
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appendix D. There are some problems here. Due to the fact that we have only replicated the index 
for NASDAQ OMX Large Cap the median values used in this study is different from the median 
used in the original study. This is because the median used in the original study is for all different 
markets and not only for the Large Cap. If some data where missing in the annual reports, 
Folksam decided to exclude that from the survey while we have tried to collect the data from 
other sources as far as possible. The reliability report (appendix D) shows that the differences are 
only minor between the index calculated in this study and the index calculated by Folksam.   
 
In a quantitative study as this one there is always a risk that, due to errors in the gathering, we 
end up with a different result than earlier studies. To minimize the risk of doing errors during the 
gathering we have followed a strict process, found in appendix E. During the data gathering we 
have also tried to be as careful as possible when it comes to the registration of the data. As said, 
errors could be made and thus be a source to problem if the study is going to be replicated. The 
fact that two different individuals have been gathering the data could also have an impact on the 
reliability. To solve this problem we have put a lot of effort in to discussing the different 
variables with each other to define a common definition on all variables.  
2.4 The survey 
2.4.1 Survey structure 
We have looked at four different parameters (the same as Folksam); gender, education, age and 
tenure. The survey has been conducted by reading the annual report from each Swedish company 
on the NASDAQ OMX Nordic Large Cap, this information has then been compiled into the 
different parameters mentioned above. 
 
The information gathered has been used to compile an index. This index has been built in the 
same way as the Folksam released index which will be described in the sub-section 2.4.3 The 
Folksam index. 
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2.4.2 Definition of diversity 
The definition of diversity is broad and can be used in a plethora of fields, from biodiversity that 
is the variation of life forms within a given ecosystem to things like diversity training that has the 
purpose of increasing the participants’ cultural awareness, for example.13 In between these you 
can find diversification in the fields of finance, business, marketing and politics, to name a few. 
The one thing that all these different definitions have in common is that they show some sort of 
variety in the group of things studied. 
 
Diversification in finance is used when risk is reduced by investing in different assets. The 
variety of different assets with uncorrelated movement on the stock exchange will give a 
portfolio that has lower risk than a portfolio with only one asset. This thinking can also be 
applied on business as shown in the article “The multicultural organization”14 where the author 
describes how a diversified workforce creates benefits when it comes to decision making, 
creativity and innovation but also to marketing to different customers. The marketing to different 
customers, for example, will get better due to the fact that your workforce better re-assembles the 
people outside your organization and in that way you know your surrounding better. 
 
To study if diversity in the terms argued by Lundberg Markow in the Folksam report does lead to 
better performance, the selected definition of diversity is the same here as in Lundberg Markow’s 
study. This includes the variables age, gender, education and tenure.  
2.4.3 Selection of companies 
The first conditions when choosing companies for the survey was that they had to be listed on a 
stock exchange. Due to regulations Swedish listed firms must disclose information about the 
variables used in this survey and this was a crucial factor to be able to carry out the work.
15
 
Hence, non-listed firms were not relevant for the survey due to lack of information about the 
board of directors. The total number of firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Nordic was 562 on 
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March 18, 2011. Excluding the Finnish, Danish and Icelandic firms leaves 250 Swedish large, 
medium and small cap firms.
16
  
 
To increase the accuracy of the survey only Swedish Large Cap firms have been studied. Large 
Cap firms are those with a market value of €1 billion or more.17 A larger set of companies would 
give a broader and more reliable study. However, the limitations in time did not make it possible 
to include a larger set of companies. By choosing Large Cap firms the intention is to exclude 
highly volatile firms where the effects of changes in board composition could be hard to capture. 
Therefore, mid and small cap firms are excluded in the survey and it has been made on Swedish 
firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Nordic Large Cap at March 18, 2011. 
2.4.4 The Folksam index 
Folksam’s index is based on the diversity in 255 Swedish listed firms. Folksam have studied both 
the board of directors and top management in the companies, since this thesis only studies the 
diversity in the boards the following description will focus on the index of board of directors.
18
  
 
The variables used to define diversity are gender, age, education and tenure. To construct an 
index of these variables the measures need to be translated into numbers. For the variables age 
and tenure a median is calculated and the index is then constructed with the median as a base.  
 
When calculating the age variable the lowest number of directors above or under median is 
divided by the higher to create the index. The tenure variable is calculated in the same way by 
dividing the lowest number of directors that have tenure either above or below median. This 
number of directors is divided by the number of directors belonging to the majority group. In the 
example below Alliance Oil have three directors below the median age and four directors above 
the median age, hence, the lowest number is divided by the higher number, three divided by four. 
The same principle is applied for the tenure variable.  
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To calculate the gender variable the number of directors belonging to the minority gender is 
divided by the number of directors belonging to the majority gender, in most cases this means 
dividing the number of women by the number of men.  
 
All directors’ education have been studied and classified into six categories; 
Business/Economics, Engineering/Natural Science, Medicine, Law, Social science and 
Humanities. To maintain quality and the possibility to replicate the study, only directors with 
degrees from higher education in one or more orientation has been included in the study. The 
education variable is then constructed by dividing the number of different orientations within the 
board with the total number of orientations, six. The underlying thought is that an index number 
close to one represents a high level of diversity in the board of directors.
19
 Attached in appendix 
A-C is the calculated diversity index and underlying variables for the companies during the years 
2005, 2007 and 2009.  
 
 Table 1. Example calculation of the Alliance Oil index 2009 
Variable Calculation Score 
Age 3 Below median / 4 Above median 0,75 
Gender 0 Women / 7 Men 0 
Education Business, engineering, social science, 3/6   0,5 
Tenure 3 Above median / 4 Below median 0,75 
  Sum 2,00 
  Index 0,50 
 
2.5 Performance measures 
To fulfill the aim of the study the calculated diversity index have been compared to selected 
performance measures to see if board diversity can have any effect on corporate performance. 
When analyzing firms performance through ratios there are five main aspects to look at. These 
are profitability, asset turnover, financial leverage, liquidity and market value.
20
 In this survey 
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return on assets and market-to-book value have been chosen to indicate the performance of the 
company. The authors view is that the ordinary investor care about these two ratios more and that 
they are simpler to compare between firms. Also, if diversity in corporate boards has any effect 
on the performance of the company it should have effect on both profitability and market value. 
Asset turnover can vary a lot between industries and individual companies and could be hard for 
the board to affect in some specific companies. Financial leverage does not need to be related to 
the success of the company and thus it should not be relevant for this study. The liquidity level of 
the company should not be affected by the level of diversity and hence it is excluded from this 
study.  
2.5.1 Return on assets 
To capture the performance measured by the profitability ratio this study uses return on assets, 
below written as ROA. This is a ratio that is commonly used in similar survey’s which increases 
the comparability to other studies. ROA is calculated by dividing earnings before interest and tax, 
EBIT, with total assets.
21
 EBIT excludes financial expenses and thus the ROA measure is a 
measure of how effectively the company uses its assets whether they are financed with equity or 
debt. ROA does not say anything about how the assets have been financed which is why it is a 
good measure to use when comparing firms between different years, companies within the same 
industry or companies within different industries with equivalent capital structure.
22
 Return on 
equity could have been used but this ratio changes as the leverage change and thus it makes it 
harder to benchmark between firms and over time.
23
  
2.5.2 Market-to-book value 
The study will also capture the value of the firm as a mean to capture the expectations by 
investors at the stock market. The Folksam competence report implies that a company needs 
diversity to be successful, and thus this should be reflected in the market value of the company
24
. 
To capture changes in market value and thus the expectations on the company the study uses the 
market-to-book value, below written as MTBV, of the individual companies. MTBV is one of 
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many ratios used to evaluate firms. For successful firms this ratio substantially exceeds 1, 
meaning that the value of the firm’s assets when put to use exceeds their liquidation value. 
Variations in this value reflect changes in fundamental firm characteristics as well as value added 
by the board of directors and management.
25
  
2.5.3 Performance measures criticism  
All performance measures have their weaknesses and by being aware of them the intention is to 
increase the quality of this study. ROA is based on the book value of the company’s assets and 
thus it is sensitive to the age of the assets as well as the company’s replacement strategy of the 
assets. A company with older assets will have a higher ROA than a company with new assets 
with high book value. Due to depreciation a company’s assets could have a book value of zero 
but still be usable in the operations, a factor that can bias the results. Further, the performance 
measure is sensitive to the firm’s source of financing in terms of purchases or leases. A company 
that purchases all their assets will have a lower ROA than a firm that leases all assets. The 
performance measures are not adjusted for leases in this study.  
 
Since MTBV is calculated by dividing the market value of assets with the book value of assets 
this ratio is influenced by the same issues regarding new and old assets as ROA is. As the assets 
are depreciated the book value will reduce and MTBV increase as long as no new assets are 
purchased and the output level remains in the old assets. Further, using MTBV as a measure for 
firm value might be questioned since the expectations from the stock market and behavioral 
reactions from shareholders have a huge influence of the MTBV ratio. However, it provides a 
picture of how the firm is valued by investors and thus tells something about how the company 
and the board of directors perform.  
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2.6 Statistical method 
In the following section (section 2.6) all information is gathered from Körner and Wahlgren
26
 if 
other source is not explicitly stated. To fulfill the aim of this study, and to show if there is any 
correlation between diversity in boards and the companies’ financial performance, statistical tests 
in the computer programme SPSS have been done. To determine which test are most suitable for 
this study it is important to clarify what kind of data that are used. This is done by assigning the 
data to different scales. The diversity index constructed for this study makes it possible to rank 
the companies after the level of diversity but it does not give the possibility to objectively 
measure the difference between the companies, hence the index is classified as ordinal scale.
27
 
Both performance measures used in this study, ROA and MTBV, are arithmetic values on an 
interval scale.
28
 For samples in an ordinal scale, non-parametric tests are suitable to use. Non-
parametric methods possess lower strength and efficiency than parametric but, since the 
conditions for parametric tests are not fulfilled, non-parametric test are used in this survey. The 
tests that are used are the Mann-Whitney U test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, these are 
appropriate when the sample is small and the variables are not normally distributed. 
 
To deepen the knowledge within diversity in relation to financial performance, each variable 
behind diversity is tested against the performance measures of the companies. Here, the nominal 
and ordinal values for gender, education, age and tenure are transformed into a relative scale. For 
these variables the number that is calculated for the index is used in the test to make it possible to 
construct a meaningful test.  
 
When carrying through the statistical test of the hypothesis one must be careful not to create a 
type I error which means that the test shows that diversity has an effect on a company’s financial 
performance when it actually has no effect at all. The test can also result in a type II error 
meaning that it shows that diversity has no effect on board financial performance when it actually 
has an effect on the financial performance.  
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2.6.1 The Mann-Whitney U test 
The Mann-Whitney U test tests two independent populations. To test any relationship between 
these two populations a hypothesis and a counter hypothesis is constructed. The advantage with 
the Mann-Whitney U test is that the samples do not need to be normally distributed as long as 
they are independent from each other. In this study the Mann-Whitney U test is used to test if 
there is any relationship between diversity in corporate boards and corporate financial 
performance.  
2.6.2 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
The purpose of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is to see if two independent populations differ 
significantly or not. An advantage with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that the test makes no 
assumption about the distribution of the data; it does not need to be normally distributed.
29
 The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has been used to identify any relationship between diversity in 
corporate boards and the companies’ financial performance.  
2.7 Theories 
A wide theoretical base will help to understand and explain the statistical results and 
relationships between diversity and financial performance. Theories about resource dependence 
and agency dilemmas are presented to help the understanding of what the board of directors 
contributes to the company. These theories were chosen after a thorough review of existing 
theories within the field. They are seen as the best fit to explain the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance according to the authors. Previous research will provide 
knowledge and empirical findings about this relationship and will further extend the theoretical 
framework in the study. These studies have carefully been selected as they match the purpose and 
focus of this study regarding both diversity and performance.  
 
The board of directors is below argued to work as a team. To help understand what benefits and 
difficulties a diversified board might face, theories regarding teamwork are given place.  
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2.8 Criticism against the methodology 
The study has, as mentioned, been done on 54 Swedish firms on the NASDAQ OMX Large Cap. 
A greater amount of companies would give the study a more conclusive picture on how 
diversified boards perform. Due to the fact that we have only looked at the NASDAQ OMX 
Large Cap the information on how different sectors perform is limited, this could also have been 
improved with a larger sample of firms. 
 
The Folksam index gives a more comprehensive view on diversification than what is usually seen 
in similar studies where often only the gender perspective has been looked at. In our study, as 
well as in the Folksam study, we have looked at four different parameters for diversification 
which will increase the likeliness of capturing how diversified the board is. To make the study 
even more comprehensive we could have added more parameters to the diversification index. 
 
Criticism against the chosen performance measures includes the vague definition of performance. 
In today’s society it is not obvious what good performance is in a company. Many argues that 
company’s should take into consideration not just financial measures but also how the company 
contributes to society as a whole, commonly known as the stakeholder theory. In this survey only 
the financial measures are taken into consideration and if the company behaves responsible 
against its stakeholders is excluded.  
 
A major downside with this study is that it excludes all other factors except the board of directors 
when it comes to company performance. It is not guaranteed that the actual composition of the 
board is the most important factor behind any change in company performance or success. Other 
factors that are relevant for drastic changes in performance are changes in the top-management 
team, increased or decreased competition or macroeconomic factors.  
 
  
28 
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3. Theory 
In the following chapter the theoretical framework of the study will be explained. It will bring 
forward the theories and perspectives needed to fully understand the analysis. The theories will 
also get criticized. 
3.1 Theoretical framework  
In the following section academic theories and previous studies linked to diversity in corporate 
board and the relationship to the companies’ financial performance is presented. The purpose is 
to provide a knowledge base that makes it easier to grasp and explain the relationship between 
diversity and financial performance as well as explaining the results of the statistical tests. 
Theories that deal with the corporate governance system and specifically the composition and 
work of the board are necessary for understanding the basic concept of the role of the board and 
its effect on company performance. Further, previous studies provide knowledge about the 
experiences and results made by researchers within the area of diversity and performance. 
Theories that focus on reasons for managing diversity and on the linkage between different team 
members is presented as a mean to explain the effect of diversity in terms of specific variables. 
This will make it easier to understand what benefits or disadvantages that might come with 
increased level of diversity and if diversity regarding any of the underlying variables are more 
important than others.  
3.2 Board of directors 
3.2.1 The role of the board 
Tricker states that the board has two roles, one is the performance role and the other is 
conformance. The performance role consist of strategy formulation and policy making, the first is 
about creating the long term strategy for the corporation and the latter is about turning the 
strategy’s into operational plans. These two roles are future focused while the conformance roles 
30 
 
are past and present focused. They consist of providing accountability to external parties and 
monitoring and supervising the company and its employees.
30
 
 
According to Tricker, directors in corporate boards believe that they should spend a majority of 
their time on future oriented tasks and less on the past and present. In reality this has proven to be 
the opposite and directors spend more time on providing accountability and monitoring.
31
 The 
view given by Tricker is that the board of directors should put most of their effort and time in the 
performance role and hence focusing on generating success for the company.  
3.2.2 The Swedish corporate governance code 
Listing rules on NASDAQ OMX Nordic states that listed firms should conduct its business in 
line with common accepted market practices and indirectly refers to the Swedish corporate 
governance code.
32
 The Swedish corporate governance code is not mandatory to follow but if a 
company does not follow some parts of the code they must explain why. The code states that the 
task of the board of directors is to manage the company’s affairs in the interest of the company 
and all its shareholders. This includes setting the goals and strategy for the company as well as 
controlling the company’s operations.33  
 
Hence, the view given is that the board of directors possesses a major responsibility for the 
financial performance of the company.  
3.3 Does the board affect company performance 
In the following section (section 3.3) all information is gathered from Zahra and Pearce
34
. Zahra 
and Pearce provide an extensive work on the effect of board composition on companies’ financial 
performance. Through a review and analysis of previous studies on the area they investigate if 
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the board affects company performance. They study the importance and effect of four different 
attributes, namely; board composition, characteristics, structure and process.  
 
According to Zahra and Pearce, board composition is argued to have an impact on director’s 
characteristics but further research is needed to conclude any effect on company performance. 
Zahra and Pearce’s review concludes that board characteristics, although a wide concept, are 
important for effective corporate financial performance. Board structure also seems to influence 
board performance although the authors are careful to draw any conclusions due to the very few 
studies conducted regarding board structure and company performance. Finally the authors 
studied if board processes had any effect on company performance. There were relatively few 
studies in the topic but the conclusion is that the length, quality and frequency of board meetings 
as well as how active the directors are in their board-related activities affect how well the board 
performs its strategic role and ultimately the company performance. 
 
The conclusion to draw from the study made by Zahra and Pearce is that good and effective work 
of the board of directors can and do have effect on company performance. The tricky thing is to 
determine which factors that have the most effect.  
3.4 Board composition 
3.4.1 Resource dependence theory 
The resource dependence theory has its origins in the organization theory and sees the board of 
directors as a link between the company and the resources the company needs to operate and 
achieve its goals. The different resources can be everything from access to capital to specific 
know-how and technology.
35
 In the article “Size and Composition of Boards of Directors: The 
organization and its environment”36 the author states that it is important to absorb even the 
institutions that cannot be absorbed directly by the company such has regulatory bodies. It is, to 
quote the author, “[...] important to obtain a favorable regulatory climate [...]”37 to be able to 
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operate the company with success. Due to the fact that you cannot absorb these kinds of bodies 
directly you need to have a connection with people that in turn possess the power to influence the 
regulatory body.
38
 As such the resource does not need to be directly connected to the board but 
can also be a connection to someone that possesses the resource. 
 
Firms in different businesses can have different needs when it comes to resources, a firm with a 
great need of capital could gain from having easy access to the capital markets. Due to their 
specific need they could, for example, need directors with close links to the financial institutions 
to get easier access to the same institutions. A firm that has great need of legal advice on the 
other hand could need attorneys in their board; this would give them the specific know-how of 
how to deal with legal problems. In short, the company should have a structure of their top 
management that is consistent with the environment around the organization.
39
   
 
The board size and composition in a company has been shown to not be random variables. 
Findings by Pfeffer show that organisations actively deal with different external factors by 
changing the structure of their board. That is, they choose different kind of resources depending 
on their need.
40
 Many studies has shown that altering the board of directors in different ways, for 
example increasing the size of the boards of directors, gives a better financial performance.
41
 
 
Zahra and Pearce argue that directors are a key linkage between executives and external 
information. With their connections to society and other corporations, directors are extracting 
resources which results in enhanced firm legitimacy in society, higher efficiency and improved 
company performance. These linkages do not only provide information and legitimacy but they 
result in favorable transactions with lower transaction costs. Hence, the directors’ connections to 
external parties improve access to vital information, enhance company performance and reduce 
transaction costs. As mentioned above, companies need different kind of resources in different 
situations. Zahra and Pearce argue that the external environment is important when constructing a 
board. In a highly volatile and hostile environment it is important to create favorable links with 
                                               
38
 Pfeffer (1972) 
39
 Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) 
40
 Pfeffer (1972) 
41
 Hillman & Dalizel (2003); Dalton et al. (1999); Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker (1994) 
33 
 
external parties and hence directors with a large network are valuable. Further, what stage the 
firm is in also affects the kind of resources necessary in the board, small entrepreneurial firms 
needs a different amount of monitoring than a multinational corporation as an example. Finally, 
what type of firm it is also affect what role the board should focus on.
42
  
3.4.2 Criticism against resource dependence theory 
One limitation with the resource dependence theory is that it does not define how directors 
actually work to link the firm with the surrounding environment. Further, it ignores the 
characteristics of the individuals and dynamic powers in the board, suggesting that it is a simple 
task to design an effective board. Also, no research has been able to show the linkage between 
the board variables and the company’s social performance, a link that is suggested by resource 
dependence theory.
43
  
 
Donaldson criticizes the resource dependence theory for its lack of justification when it comes to 
how organizations should be viewed. According to Donaldson the resource dependence theory 
fails to justify why you should see the organization as a political system and not as a technical or 
economic system that is usually the case. As an example Donaldson looks at the studies done on 
mergers within the resource dependence theory. He states that these neglect or fail to capture the 
economic factors behind a merger. Further, he states that the empirical studies done within the 
resource dependence field simply captures the exchange of goods and thus the economic power 
and not the political power that they try to capture.
44
 
3.4.3 Agency theory 
According to the agency theory the role of the board is to resolve agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Independent directors are here a critical factor for the board to 
function in the best interest of shareholders. The question is therefore if diversity increases the 
independence of the board of directors and their ability to monitor managers. An argument that 
this is the case is that people with different backgrounds than the traditional directors ask 
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different questions due to different experiences and values. This, however, might not at all be the 
case since the minority director can be marginalized in the group.
45
 
 
Zahra and Pearce argue about the agency theory relative to company performance. According to 
the authors the board’s contribution to company performance lies in minimizing agency costs 
caused by executives that do not comply with stated goals and procedures.
46
 They state that 
agency theory adopts three major roles for the board in performing this task. The most important 
is control of management and the other two are to provide service and strategy for the 
company.
47
 Hence, good and effective board work affects the performance of the company 
through putting pressure and controlling management while in the same time having a major 
responsibility over the long term strategy. A relevant question for this thesis is whether a 
diversified board is better suited to perform these tasks.  
 
The composition of the board is one way to mitigate the agency problem. To bring external 
members to the board, that has their reputation at stake, might be one way to alter the 
composition of the board to better solve the agency problem. To bring in external members might 
also mitigate the “group think” behavior that an otherwise homogeneous group would be prone 
to. The re-composition of the board to better mitigate the agency problem will, in theory, ensure 
that the managements decisions are consistent with the boards, namely to increase shareholder 
value and thus corporate performance.
48
 Bathala and Rao conclude in their article from 1995 that 
board composition is related to agency costs. With Zahra and Pearce conclusions in mind a better 
composed board should lead to better corporate performance. The results by Bathala and Rao 
points in the direction that companies choose composition of their board depending on what other 
types of devices to mitigate the agency problem they have in use. Such devices can for example 
be dividend policies and inside equity ownership according to Bathala and Rao.
49
  
3.4.4 Criticism against the agency theory 
                                               
45
 Carter et al. (2003) 
46
 Zahra & Pearce (1989) 
47
 IBID. 
48
 Bathala & Rao (1995) 
49
 IBID. 
35 
 
Agency theory does not stand without criticism. One critique is that the theory’s assumptions 
regarding top managements values, and the lack of interest to maximize shareholder value, may 
not be as bad as one might first think. In a time where companies’ responsibility to society is 
getting more important, short-time deviation from maximization of shareholder-value might be 
good for the long-term profitability. Another criticism is that researchers have found it hard to 
document how well directors perform their task and hence to which extent they do a credible job 
in monitoring managers. A third shortcoming is that agency theory emphasis the board’s strategic 
role but critics argue that the boards contribution to the strategic work is too infrequent to make 
any difference in the strategic work. Same critics argue that CEO’s do not want directors to do 
the strategic work which they think are their domain.
50
  
 
Other critics argue that agency theory is a narrow theoretical scope which simplifies corporate 
governance to a contract between principals and agents. According to these critics agency theory 
focus too much on quantitative measures such as board structure and misses the interpersonal 
behavior, group dynamics and political intrigue. Further, many argue that the model is simplistic 
in practice as the ownership structures of today are very complicated. With large ownership 
stakes belonging to international hedge funds or pension funds which in their turn are owned by 
some other fund, it can get very hard to know which owners interest to take into account.
51
 
3.4.5 Previous studies 
Carter and his colleagues are some of the researchers that have studied the importance of board 
diversity. In their study they examined the level of diversity in terms of number of women and 
ethnic minorities (African Americans, Asian and Hispanics) in the board of directors and the 
relationship between this measure of diversity and firm value. The study was made on 638 traded 
Fortune 1000 firms that provided the necessary information to be able to carry through the study. 
The authors control their statistical results for size, industry and other measures and can show, 
contrary to their hypothesis, a statistically significant relationship between diversity in terms of 
women or minorities on the board and firm value measured as Tobin’s Q.52  
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Erhart, Werbel and Schrader also study the effect of board composition with diversity defined as 
the representation of both ethnic and gender differences among directors.
53
 They put diversity in 
relation to the financial performance of the companies, measured as ROA and ROI. They present 
literature suggesting that diversity results in higher creativity, innovation and quality decision-
making. Erhart, Werbel and Schrader argue that this is applicable to the board of directors as 
well. Therefore the following hypothesis is proposed in their paper: “Greater demographic 
diversity among board members increases organizational performance”54. The data for the 
analysis included 112 large public US companies in various industries and both regression 
analysis and correlation where used to illustrate any relationship between diversity and ROI or 
ROA. The results from the analysis supported the hypothesis that increased diversity in boards 
increased company performance, measured both as ROI and ROA.
55
  
 
Most of the previous research on board diversity focuses on the gender of the directors. Adams 
and Ferreira took this point in their paper from 2009 where they studied the effect of female 
directors in 1939 firms for the period 1996-2003. They examined the governance characteristics 
of the board of directors in terms of attendance to meetings and committee assignments for 
female directors as well as the impact of gender diversity on performance. There conclusions are 
that women attend board meetings more frequently than men and that this also have an impact on 
the attendance of men which increases. They further show that women are more likely than men 
to sit on committees with monitoring functions and less likely to sit in the compensations 
committee. Further they conclude that there is no significant correlation between gender diversity 
in boards and company performance measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q, if any, the relation seems 
to be negative. One reason may be that if firms have otherwise strong governance, a tough board 
could lead to over monitoring which harms the firm. As said, the authors state that female 
directors are more likely to be members of monitoring committees and they are tougher in their 
monitoring of management.
56
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Campbell and Vera studied the relationship between female directors and firm value in a sample 
of 68 firms. The authors present both ethical and economic arguments as motivations why the 
presence of female directors is positively related to firm value and proposes a hypothesis that the 
stock market will react positively to female board appointments.
57
 Through statistical test the 
authors concludes that the appointment of female directors is positively viewed by investors 
which confirms the hypothesis and also matches previous research within the field.
58
  
3.5 Reasons for managing diversity in companies 
In the following section (section 3.5) all information is gathered from Robinson and Dechant
59
 if 
not other source is explicitly stated. Robinson and Dechant argues that diversity in corporations 
of today is a broad concept and that companies tend to favor a definition that includes gender, 
ethnicity, age, physical abilities, qualities, and sexual orientation as well as difference in 
attitudes, perspectives and background. 
 
The authors state three arguments for managing diversity in firms. The first is related to the 
higher cost associated with a mismatch in diversity. In USA, the turnover among women and 
Afro-American people is higher than the turnover among white men and a costly problem for 
companies. A major reason for the high turnover rates among women is lack of opportunity for 
career growth. Managing diversity will help companies save costs and retain competent staff. 
Argument number two is to win the competition for talent. As women and other minorities 
becomes a larger part of the workforce, companies are competing to hire and retain the most 
competent employees from the minority groups. Companies cited to be the best places to work 
for women and minorities get more applications and thus get a better chance to hire the best 
individuals. The third argument states that a diversified firm is a powerful tool to drive business 
growth, first of all through better understanding of the marketplace, as customers and markets are 
becoming more diversified. Further, a diversified workforce stimulates creativity and innovation. 
It also creates higher quality problem-solving as research shows that teams produce more 
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innovative solutions to problems. Leadership effectiveness is improved with increased 
demographic composition and ethno-cultural diversity leads to better global relations. 
 
Cox and Blake have a similar discussion regarding benefits of managing diversity in firms; they 
state six different arguments why diversity is an issue to work with. First, the cost argument is 
about reducing costs of integrating increasingly diversified personnel. Second, resource 
acquisition is about attracting the best employees and the third argument is that a multi-national 
staff will improve the firms marketing efforts in domestic and foreign operations. Fourth, the 
creativity argument is based on increased creativity in more diversified teams, and fifth, the 
problem-solving arguments are motivated by better decision making in heterogeneous groups. 
These five arguments are very similar to the ones presented by Robinson and Dechant above, 
what Cox and Blake also add is a system flexibility argument. This last argument is based on the 
idea that the system will become less standardized and instead more fluid due to increased 
diversity, this gives the company a flexibility to react to environmental changes faster and at 
lower costs.
60
 
3.6 The board as a team 
"A team is a small number of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common 
purpose, performance goals, and approach for which they are mutually accountable."
61
 With this 
definition of a team the board of directors could be seen as one. In the study made in this thesis 
the average board had eight people in it, this must be seen as a small number of people. The 
diversity measured shows that most of the boards seem to have complementary skills in it and to 
be able to sit in a board the individual has most probably showed that it is committed to the 
company’s goal. With this in mind the board of directors could be seen as a team and thus follow 
the basic theories regarding what makes teams successful. 
 
Belbin identifies six key factors in successful teams regarding the attributes of the members and 
the structure of the work. First of all the person in the chair is important, this person must work 
together with the other directors and not against, although having the ability to take critical 
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decisions. The second factor is the presence of one strong plant, which is a very creative and 
clever person, this proved to be an advantage for the company. Boards must also have a spread in 
mental abilities, one director can be the clever person whilst another might be the coordinator of 
the team, and the third might be the visionary director. A spread in personal attributes is the 
fourth factor. Successful teams seem to have members with different attributes such as one 
person that is good at implementing projects while another is good at finishing projects. Next, a 
good match between these personal attributes and the person’s responsibility in the team is a 
success factor. Winning teams reduce their reliance on a member for a critical function until that 
person show that it can handle the responsibility in a good manner. The final factors identified by 
Belbin are the ability to adjust to the realization of imbalance. That is, if a team lacks some 
competencies or abilities it can better handle the situation if it is aware of it shortage.
62
  
 
Lind and Skärvad draw similar conclusions as Belbin through a review of research within the 
field. They state three conditions that must be fulfilled to achieve successful teamwork. Teams 
must know what they are expected to achieve and have clear task to perform. Further, teams must 
get meaningful tasks to maintain stimulation and motivation among the team members. Finally, 
the members must be able to work together as a whole in good group dynamics.
63
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4. Hypothesis 
In the following chapter the hypothesis of the study is motivated and presented.  
 
In a quantitative study, such as this one, a hypothesis formulation is an appropriate way to work 
with the material gained through the statistical results. With the use of a null hypothesis (H0) and 
a hypothesis that rejects the null hypothesis (H1) we can determine if the null hypothesis holds or 
not.
64
 If the statistical material shows a confidence level of 5% we can accept the null hypothesis 
(H0) and so reject H1. If we cannot get a 5% confidence level we cannot reject the hypothesis 
stated.
65
 With the use of the earlier studies and theory surrounding the field we will formulate our 
hypothesis below. 
 
As the study is based on the thought that the boards of directors can affect the firm performance 
this hypothesis will not be tested here. This has been tested and shown to be the case by other 
studies as stated earlier. The hypothesis is based upon the resource dependence theory and 
agency theory, namely that a more diversified board will give more resources and better 
monitoring and thus better firm performance. Robinson and Dechant also states that a more 
diversified board could better understand the marketplace and thus give better firm performance. 
The hypothesis will use the Folksam diversity index replicated for the years 2005, 2007 and 2009 
to see if a more diversified firm will yield a better firm performance. The hypothesis will be 
formulated in the following way. 
 
H0: A more diversified board of directors will yield a higher financial performance. 
 
And so H1 will be the opposite. 
 
H1: A more diversified board of directors will not yield a higher financial performance. 
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5. Empirical approach 
The chapter will explain the process of creating the index; the problems encountered and bring 
forward what could affect the performance variables. 
5.1 The work process 
The companies listed on Large Cap all provide good and useful information for this study. 
However, some data where missing which forced the authors to make decisions how to handle 
the data. Information needed to construct the diversity index was missing for Hufvudstaden AB, 
Husqvarna AB and Melker Schörling AB for the year 2005. We chose to exclude these 
companies from the statistical test this year. The alternative would have been to give them an 
average index score or use the same index score as for 2007 but that would harm the study.  
 
Two companies did not provide information about the education of their directors; these 
companies were ABB Ltd. and AstraZeneca Plc. This information was gathered by reading about 
the directors in other companies’ financial reports and by using the Bloomberg Businessweek’s 
executive profiles database. 
 
In performing the statistical test the companies where divided into two groups. One group 
representing the companies with the best measure of the specific variable or index score, the 
other group included those companies with the worst variable or index score. To answer the 
hypothesis, statistical methods were used to see if the companies in the group with the best score 
also had the best financial performance measures. 
 
For each variable a separate breakdown into two groups were made. This was done to test if any 
variable is more important for the financial performance of the firms than the other variables. As 
an example, when testing the index 2005 against the financial performance the companies were 
divided into one group of companies with an index lower than 0,5. Group 1 and group 2 
consisted of companies with an index of 0,5 or more. Group 1 should then represent the 
companies with the lowest level of diversity while group 2 represented the highest level of 
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diversity firms. If the hypothesis holds, group 2 should perform better financial results. Table 2 
shows how the companies where separated into two groups for each variable each separate year. 
For each variable the intention was to keep the groups at approximately the same size, this is why 
not all groups are divided at the level 0,5 
 
          Table 2. Groups for statistical test 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 1 Group 2 
  
Low 
diversity 
High diversity 
Sample 
size 
Sample 
size 
2005         
Index 0-0,47 0,48-1 25 25-26* 
Gender 0-0,14 0,17-1 30 21 
Education 0-0,33 0,5-1 18 33 
Age 0-0,14 0,17-1 30 21 
Tenure 0-0,5 0,6-1 22 29 
2007         
Index 0-0,46 0,47-1 27 27 
Gender 0-0,25 0,29-1 26 28 
Education 0-0,49 0,5-1 21 33 
Age 0-0,6 0,67-1 29 25 
Tenure 0-0,5 0,57 28 26 
2009         
Index 0-0,47 0,48-1 26 28 
Gender 0-0,29 0,33-1 29 25 
Education 0-0,33 0,5-1 17 37 
Age 0-0,60 0,67-1 26 28 
Tenure 0-0,43 0,5-1 24 30 
 *Differs because of missing performance measures for one company. 
 
The variable that have been hardest to break down into two groups is the education variable. This 
is because the majority of the companies have three education orientations represented in the 
board and it is a quite large step between the different companies. Due to the construction of the 
index there are only seven levels for which the education variable can be divided into, 0; 0,17; 
0,33; 0,5; 0,67; 0,83 or 1.  
 
When making an analysis of the effect of board diversity on the companies’ financial 
performance one must determine when the effect of the board work is seen in the financial 
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results. The effect on the financial performance of the company is due to the performance role of 
the board, explained above. This performance role is future oriented and the results of a good 
work are not seen immediately. Rather than affecting the results the current year it is likely that 
some decisions have impact after two years while some long-term strategic decisions affect the 
financial results in even more years. To capture this issue the study have been conducted so that 
the diversity measures of a specific year is analyses against the performance measures of the 
same year but also the following years. Taking the diversity variable age for the year of 2007, it 
have been analyzed i relation to ROA 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 as well as MTBV 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010. In that way the intention is to capture the importance of a well composed board 
on a few years sight.  
5.2 Variables affecting the financial performance 
What must be noticed is that the financial performance of companies is affected by so many other 
things than the performance of the board and the level of the diversity in the board.  
 
To begin with we have disturbance on the macro level to take into account. A sudden earthquake 
with a following tsunami as the one that could be seen in Japan during 2011 can cause major 
volatility in a company’s financial performance. Such a drop or raise would not be caused by the 
board of directors and are not in their control, thus such financial volatility would cause the 
statistical study to show skewed results. Other things on the macro level that causes problems 
are, for example, volatile exchange rates and volatile international trade to name a few. There are 
a plethora of other variables, some that can be measured other that cannot.  
 
To continue our exploration of variables that affects the financial performance we can look at the 
micro level. A sudden drop or raise in the demand of wood for a company like Stora Enso AB 
could cause volatility in their financial performance, a volatility not accounted for by the boards 
of directors. Sudden volatility in the supplies could also cause financial volatility that is not 
accounted for by the boards of directors. Although the boards of directors can work with 
strategies to keep the volatility of the supply down it is very hard to know if it is actually the 
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strategy that the company uses, or other variables, that causes the company to get a better 
financial performance. 
 
Even inside the company there are variables that are outside the control of the board of directors, 
such as mistakes done by employees. A variable such as mistakes are notoriously hard to 
quantify but can cause significant volatility in the financial performance. As can be seen there are 
variables in the macro level and all the way down to the individual firm and employee level that 
can cause volatility in the financial performance. It is thus very hard to say if the variables that 
have been used in this study are actually the variables that are causing significant changes in the 
financial performance. The variables used here should therefore be seen as a part in a larger 
picture. 
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6. Results 
The chapter begins with a review of the results of the statistical test of diversity in relation to 
ROA and MTBV. Then follows a review of each individual variable compared to the performance 
measures.  
6.1 Diversity effect on companies’ financial performance 
To show the relationship between the level of diversity in the board of directors and companies’ 
financial performance this study applies the statistical tests Mann-Whitney U test and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov. The constructed diversity index as well as the underlying variables for the 
three years 2005, 2007 and 2009 has been put in relation to ROA and MTBV for the years 2005-
2010. The results showed to be inconclusive and only in a few cases showed to be of any 
statistical significance. Below the different tests will be commented. The statistical results for the 
diversity index are shown in table 3 while the results for the underlying variables each separate 
year as well as the complete test of the index are found in appendix F-J. 
6.1.1 Index 
The relationship between the index as a measure of diversity and the financial performance was 
the first thing to study. The results from the Mann-Whitney U test are inconclusive. Index for 
each year in relation to ROA the years that follow does not result in any significant differences. 
Contrary to the hypothesis however, it looks as high diversity boards show a slightly lower mean 
rank the following years but it is not on the significance level and could therefore be random. 
Looking at the final sample from 2009 the pattern looks similar and it is hard to show any 
relationship. Hence, the statistical results provided by the Mann-Whitney U test do not support 
the hypothesis and could be random. The test results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov show a 
significance above the 5% level at all of the measured points and years meaning that the two 
samples, low and high diversity, does not differ in distribution when it comes to financial 
performance.  
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To identify if diversity in the board of directors leads to a higher firm value the relationship 
between the index and firms’ market-to-book value is presented below. Only one significant 
result could be shown in the results of 2005; that is, a low diversity 2005 is connected to high 
MTBV 2009 with significance at the 5% level. It is not possible to show any other relationship 
for the statistical tests of the diversity during 2007. Looking at the tests for 2009 the results did 
not show any significance for the Mann-Whitney U test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 2005 
shows that the significance is above the 5% level for all years following, thus the two samples 
does not differ in distribution. The same results are shown for 2007 and 2009, meaning that the 
samples do not differ in distribution. 
 
The table below shows the statistical results for the testing of the diversity index compared to 
ROA and MTBV. The only significant result is commented as negative, meaning that it is a low 
level of diversity that has a significant relationship to the performance measure. In appendix F 
the complete statistical test of the index can be found.  
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 Table 3. Significance level for the testing of the diversity index 
Diversity 
variable 
Year Tested against 
Mann-Whitney 
Significance 
Positive or 
negative 
relationship 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Significance 
Index 2005 MTBV 2005 0,327  0,155 
Index 2005 MTBV 2006 0,239  0,541 
Index 2005 MTBV 2007 0,346  0,559 
Index 2005 MTBV 2008 0,160  0,126 
Index 2005 MTBV 2009 0,038 Negative 0,058 
Index 2005 MTBV 2010 0,101  0,117 
Index 2005 ROA 2005 0,869  0,906 
Index 2005 ROA 2006 0,854  0,155 
Index 2005 ROA 2007 0,158  0,206 
Index 2005 ROA 2008 0,187  0,123 
Index 2005 ROA 2009 0,407  0,623 
Index 2005 ROA 2010 0,221  0,111 
      
Index 2007 MTBV 2007 0,860  0,744 
Index 2007 MTBV 2008 0,197  0,324 
Index 2007 MTBV 2009 0,822  0,744 
Index 2007 MTBV 2010 0,505  0,324 
Index 2007 ROA 2007 0,586  0,518 
Index 2007 ROA 2008 0,517  0,518 
Index 2007 ROA 2009 0,320  0,518 
Index 2007 ROA 2010 0,355  0,518 
      
Index 2009 MTBV 2009 0,373  0,549 
Index 2009 MTBV 2010 0,166  0,424 
Index 2009 ROA 2009 0,604  0,667 
Index 2009 ROA 2010 0,083  0,097 
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6.1.2 Age 
The first underlying variable looked at was the age variable. The Mann-Whitney U test showed 
no significance in the relationship between age and MTBV except for age 2009 in relation to 
MTBV 2010. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the significance levels are low, only 
with the 2009 data a significance level at 5% can be measured when looking at MTBV. When 
looking at the ROA variable the results are, more or less, the same. That is, the significance level 
is not at the 5% level any of the measured years, with the exception of MTBV 2009. The 
complete test results are found in appendix G. 
6.1.3 Education 
The education variable showed the same symptom as the other variables, namely that the results 
are a bit different from year to year and, most of the years, cannot reach the desired significant 
level. Only during one year, when the data for education 2005 was compared to MTVB 2007, the 
Mann-Whitney U test showed a significance level at the 5% level. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
showed no significance at the 5% level for any years. The significance level measured by the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed no significance any of the years for the ROA variable. 
Significance at the 5% level could only be found in one case, see appendix H. 
6.1.4 Gender 
Studying the results from the Mann-Whitney test it does not support the null hypothesis. The 
Mann-Whitney test can only show one significant relationship between gender and ROA, that is 
for the data from 2005, as seen in appendix I. Mann-Whitney show no significant relationship 
between gender and MTBV any of the years. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates the same 
thing as the Mann-Whitney U test, namely that no significant relationship between gender and 
ROA could be found. For the test statistics of 2007 two significant relationships appear as seen in 
appendix I. Further, one significant relationship between gender and ROA is found when looking 
at the results from 2005. Testing the relationship between gender and MTBV cannot show 
significance any of the years. This holds for both the Mann-Whitney U test and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov.  
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6.1.5 Tenure 
Regarding tenure the measurement point 2007 shows that low diversity could be better for the 
financial performance. The relationship between low diversity 2007 and high ROA the same year 
is at a significant level. 2009 seems to be a turnaround for the importance of diversity regarding 
tenure, a high ROA 2010 is significantly related to high diversity regarding tenure the year 
before, at the 5% level. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is not able to show any results at the 5% 
level, for ROA, any of the tested years. For detailed statistical data regarding the tenure variable 
see appendix J.  
 
Testing for MTBV and tenure 2005 with the Mann-Whitney U test shows mixed results, at some 
points low diversity is better than high diversity. When tenure is measured against MTVB, it 
reaches a significant level three out of six years following the sample of 2005. Low diversity 
firms also have a higher MTBV when looking at the 2007 year sample but these points are not at 
a significant level and are thus seen as random. Kolmogorov-Smirnov provides us with test 
results that show no significance except for one measured point, which is the relationship 
between tenure 2005 and MTBV 2009.  
 
Putting all these data together show that the results are inconclusive and some years provide 
significance levels that indicate that more diversified boards are beneficial for the financial 
results of the company while other years indicate the opposite.  
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7. Analysis 
Below is the analysis of the study in which empirical data are interwoven with the theory in a 
narrative form. First an analytical review of the statistical test is presented, followed by an 
increased focus on academic theories and a deeper analysis of the diversity index and its 
meaning. 
7.1 Introduction 
The statistical test of this study show some interesting results regarding diversity in corporate 
boards and firms’ financial performance. The statistical test, covering 6 years of financial 
performance measures and 54 companies, could not show any major significance in the results. 
The few results that had significance showed both positive and negative relation between 
diversity and financial performance and thus it is hard to draw any statistical conclusions.  
 
Previous studies have shown a positive relationship between both diversity and firm value as well 
as between diversity and financial performance. However, other studies have not been able to 
show any relationship at all between board diversity and financial performance. The topic is thus 
divided into different groups where some can show significant relationship and others cannot. 
One major reason why researchers come to different results is that a common ground for the 
definition of diversity is missing. Depending on what variables to include and which performance 
measures to study the results will vary between different studies. This study can give further 
insight in how complex this topic is and how hard it actually is to create a working index of 
diversity but also connecting this index to performance measures. 
7.2 The statistical tests 
The statistical tests provide inconclusive numbers when testing the diversity index against ROA 
and MTBV. As the main focus of this study is the effects of diversity in terms of the constructed 
index, this is the first thing to analyze. Previous studies and academic theories indicate that there 
should be an advantage with having a diversified board of directors. However, the statistics did 
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not provide any significant result that supported this view. Instead, one measurement point 
indicated that the low diversity firms had higher MTBV value than the high diversity firms. To 
start with it could be good to note that all corporations face pressure from their shareholders to 
perform good results. As stated by Tricker the board of directors has both a conformance role and 
a performance role, of which the latter should be in focus. Whether it is a homogeneous or 
heterogeneous board of directors they have the task to manage the company’s affairs in the 
interest of the shareholders, as declared by the Swedish corporate governance code. The results 
from this study cannot support the hypothesis that a more diversified board is better in 
performing its task. However, it does provide important inputs regarding the lack of a proper way 
to measure diversity.  
 
Zahra and Pearce declared that the length, quality and frequency of board meetings ultimately 
affect the company performance. Some authors argue that directors with different backgrounds or 
experiences provide the board with higher creativity, innovation and quality decision making. 
Due to the insignificance in the statistical test this study cannot confirm nor reject that this is the 
case.  
 
Another factor influencing the performance of the board is how active the directors are in their 
work, as mentioned by Zahra and Pearce. One might argue that directors belonging to a minority 
group, for example belonging to the minority gender or with an educational background that no 
other director have, would be more active in the board meetings than the average directors. This 
would be since the minority director would have different inputs to share with the board and 
simply because these directors want to assert him or herself against other board members. On the 
other hand, this could be countered by the other directors fighting against this upcoming 
competitor within the board. Since the statistical results in the majority of cases show no 
significance the latter argument ought to be closer to reality.  
 
This study cannot prove that more diversity in the board of directors increases the financial 
performance of firms and thus it provides no support for the argument that increased performance 
is an outcome of diversity in boards. It should be stressed though that the limitations in the study 
also makes it hard to argue against such a statement. 
55 
 
 
Testing the individual variables against the selected performance measures did not give any 
major differences to the results. Most of the testing ended up without significance at the 5% 
level. One testing stood out and that was the directors’ tenure on the board. The sample from 
2005 versus MTBV the following years provided a result that indicated a negative relationship 
between diversification regarding tenure and firms’ MTBV, for several years under the 5% 
significance level. Next sample from 2007 and 2009 did not result in the same significant 
relationship. Still, what factors in a homogeneous board, regarding directors’ tenure, might have 
positive impact on the MTBV of firms? One could argue that a firms’ MTBV is ultimately 
affected by the expectations from the stock market and thus the important factors would be those 
that are clearly visible for the shareholders. The agency theory, as stated above, focus on putting 
pressure and controlling management to minimize the agency costs. If we argue that a 
homogeneous board in terms of tenure is a board where the majority of the directors have spent 
many years in the board room, they could be better in their monitoring function than a board with 
several directors with less experience. However, long time service on the board could build up a 
relationship between directors and the top management which could influence their 
independence. Tighter monitoring is not automatically better, as stated by Adams and Ferreira. 
Too much monitoring could harm the firm.  
 
Previous studies have shown that female directors are more likely to be in monitoring functions 
of the board. However, the statistical test of the gender variable show few significant 
relationships between diversity regarding gender and either ROA or MTBV. Thus the statistical 
results cannot tell if directors belonging to the minority gender add anything to the performance 
of the board but it cannot tell the opposite either. The results can neither support nor reject the 
conclusion presented by Campbell and Vera who found a relationship between gender diversity 
and firm value. However, it supports the study made by Adams and Ferreira who could not find 
any statistical significance in the relationship between gender diversity and company 
performance measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q. Thus, the research within the area is inconclusive.  
 
The statistical test of the age variable did not provide the study with more than one significant 
result out of the twenty-four points measured. From a resource dependence perspective, diversity 
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regarding age can at a first glance not seem very important. A person’s connections and network 
should grow as the person is getting older and hence an age diverse set of directors may provide 
fewer resources to external parties than a less diverse but with higher mean age board. Hence, the 
resource dependence theory ought to support these statistical tests.  
 
Only one significant positive relationship between education and MTBV can be found. Education 
is a factor that indicates what kind of competence and interests the directors possesses. We argue 
that education tells something about what knowledge the directors bring to the board work. The 
more represented educational orientations brought to the board, the more suited the board is to 
adapting to changes in the external environment. One possible reason that the results show only 
one significant relationship is that the majority of the boards had two or three different 
educational orientations resulting in an index of 0,33 or 0,50. The construction of the index made 
it hard to capture small differences in education and it is hard to separate the companies from 
each other. This proves to be a limitation in the diversity index. A more sensitive construction of 
the index and its variables would be beneficial for the results and better capture the differences in 
educational orientations and knowledge within the boards. Reconstructing the education variable 
could improve the accuracy of the index and maybe come to a result that supports the conclusion 
provided by Erhart, Werbel and Schrader that greater diversity increases company performance 
measured as return on investment and ROA.  
 
It has become clear during the analysis of the study that the Folksam diversity index might be 
biased or at least not an obvious measure of the diversity in the corporate boards. The variables 
age and tenure are constructed with the median of the total number of directors as a base, 
throughout the work of this study this way of quantifying diversity have showed limitations. The 
median age of the directors 2009 is 58 years old. A board with three members younger than 58 
and three members older than 58 years would generate a score of 1. This would be the case both 
if the members have scattered ages of 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80 years old and if the members ages 
are very concentrated around 58 years, say three members that are 56 years old and tree members 
that are 60 years old. Hence, the construction of the scoring variables makes it hard to capture the 
real level of diversity in the board of directors both for the age and tenure variables and one could 
ask if this is a good measure of diversity.   
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These identified weaknesses in the underlying variables are likely reasons why this study has not 
come to the same conclusion as many other studies. For example Erhart, Werbel and Schrader 
concluded that increased diversity in boards increases company performance and Campbell and 
Vera concluded that the appointment of female directors to the board is positively related with 
firm value.  
 
The arguments put forward by Robinson and Dechant does not seem to have a major influence on 
the firms’ financial performance. Both the cost saving and the competition for talent argument as 
well as the argument that diversity is a tool to drive business growth are fully reasonable 
arguments. The latter argument is also very similar to the arguments stressed by Lundberg 
Markow, perhaps because business growth is considered to be important and a viable argument 
for managing diversity. Due to the low significance levels in the testing any of these reasons 
cannot be supported. Cox and Blake provided similar arguments as presented above and the 
terminology is even here similar to the one provided by Lundberg Markow. Their arguments, as 
well as the argumentation by Lundberg Markow, are very reasonable and possess logic thinking. 
However, none of their arguments finds support in this study as no statistical significance can be 
reached.  
7.3 What can theories explain? 
Regarding the resource dependence theory, earlier studies can show that alterations in the board, 
for example increasing the size and in that way get more resources into the board, is related to 
better financial performance.  
 
This study gives some indications that a more diversified board should be able to perform better 
financially than a less diversified board but the findings are inconclusive and the significant 
results are few in numbers. The results can thus be seen as random and cannot confirm or reject 
the hypothesis stated. Further the study cannot disclose what kind of connections different 
directors have to the outside and so cannot verify or reject if the explanation made by the 
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resource dependence theory to the impact on financial performance is true or false. This is 
something that could be tested in future studies.  
 
Although the statistical results cannot verify or reject the resource dependence theory, the theory 
could give one explanation to why some measure points are at a significant level. The theory 
states that a more diversified board should have more resources connected to the company. The 
more resources connected, the better the financial performance. Weaknesses in the index could 
be a reason to why the significant points are few. A larger sample with an improved diversity 
measure could lead to a more clear relationship between resource dependence theory and the 
statistical findings.  
 
The agency theory states that independent board of directors is a critical factor for the board 
function. The more independent directors you have, the better the monitoring will be. Earlier 
studies (e.g. Carter et al. 2003) indicate that people with different backgrounds than traditional 
directors ask different questions due to their experiences and values and should thus increase the 
monitoring. Our study cannot show that better diversification should give better financial 
performance and thus not provide support to the view that that a diversified board increases the 
monitoring. 
 
Further, Adams and Ferreira states that more women in the board should lead to more monitoring 
as women often sit in the monitoring committees and thus decrease the agency costs. Decreased 
agency costs should lead to overall lower costs in the company and thus boost the financial 
performance. The measure points that provide a significant relationship between gender and 
ROA could be due to decreased agency costs. However, many measure points do not provide 
significant results and thus the study can indicate that this field needs more research. Thus, the 
results in this study can neither confirm nor reject the conclusion made by Bathala and Rao that 
board composition is related to agency costs.  
 
By looking at the board of directors as teams we can get even more pointers to why the results 
are showing what it does. Belbin states that a spread of personal attributes is a key to successful 
teams. With a diversified board it should be easier to get different personal attributes into the 
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team. If the team manages to work together in a good way, as Lind and  Skärvad argues is a need 
to get a well performing team, the diversified team should be able to perform better than a non-
diversified team. Diversity might very well be an important factor for the financial performance 
of companies but if the diversified board of directors do not manage to work as a team the results 
may be counteractive. This could explain why our statistics, most often, is pointing in different 
direction regarding the significance level.  
 
To conclude the topic this study confirms the complexity within the field as showed by the 
various results in previous studies. Some studies manage to show a relationship between different 
diversity measures and firms’ performance while others do not manage to show this relationship. 
Reasons that some studies show a relationship between diversity and performance is that the 
more different kinds of knowledge, attributes and experiences you get into your board the better 
it should perform. This is if you get it all to work together and manage to extract the synergies. 
Why studies sometimes show that it is worse to have a more diversified board could be due to 
this, that the team cannot extract all synergies.   
7.4 What is giving birth to what? 
Many theories and studies, such as the resource dependence theory and agency theory states that 
the boards work could influence the financial performance. What is very hard to determine is if 
the better financial performance is due to better board work or the other way around.  
 
Diversity proponents such as Lundberg Markow argue that increased diversity in top layers of 
corporate hierarchies is related to financial success. They say that with increased diversity the 
results will follow. The results in this study do not show a significant relationship between 
diversity in corporate boards and financial performance so one might ask if the diversity 
proponents may be wrong. It is not possible to say that they are wrong with this amount of 
information. Further, the level of board diversity might be so low that it does not provide any 
effect on the financial performance. For example, with only one female director the level of 
board diversity is higher than a board with only men. It could be that the board might need 50% 
women to achieve a substantial effect since the women might be marginalized. The problem is to 
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determine what amount of diversity that is considered as a good level of diversity. This creates a 
validity problem in the study. Future case studies would be a way to provide information about 
what variables that are important for the level of diversity and how much diversity that is needed. 
This could improve the validity in future studies.  
 
This study does not explain whether diversity leads to increased financial performance or if it is 
the contrary. We argue though, that a company and a board that is delivering great results will be 
more comfortable in their roles and more willing to bring in more minority directors such as 
females, young individuals or persons with different educational background. A company that 
performs bad results might be more reluctant to bring in untested individuals that they do not 
know very well. Hence, if a firm is delivering bad results the risk may be that they elect directors 
that are familiar to the existing management and board and that may be persons with similar 
education, background and age.  
 
The belief that people are afraid to try new thing during bad times make the authors believe that 
it is more common that diversified board is due to good performance and not the other way 
around.  
7.5 What about the time horizon? 
When looking over time the results from our study is hard to interpret. Since there are few 
significant results in the statistical test it is also hard to see any changes in the financial 
performance over time, neither positive nor negative. Further, it is not possible to identify any 
pattern in what time horizon the performance measures are better than average. Taking this 
perspective into account, the statistical results look even more random.  
 
The reasons for the problem in finding clear conclusions in this matter could be that the index 
used is insensitive to change. Extensive changes in the composition of the board are needed for 
any significant change in the index to occur and thus the changes can be hard to measure with 
this index. Further, since the study have had a hard time to show any significance at all it has also 
been hard to show any changes over time. 
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7.6 Is the Folksam index a good measure? 
Lundberg Markow emphasis the importance of diversity in top layers of corporations, she does 
this with support from arguments such as, more diverse groups provide different perspectives, 
experiences and angels and thus creating a more open attitude. These are arguments that 
frequently occur in the academic literature and are, according to us, reasonable and hard to argue 
against. However, with the desire to highlight the importance of diversity in the top layers of 
corporations, Folksam and Lundberg Markow construct a diversity index that is supposed to rank 
Swedish corporation after the level of diversity. Folksam does this with a base in the fundamental 
arguments presented above.  
 
As concluded above, the index simplifies the meaning of age and tenure by using the median 
level as a base for the score. It have shown during the analysis that this makes it hard to actually 
grasp the level of diversity regarding age and tenure more than concluding how many directors 
that are above or below the median value. Further, the education variable is not enough to grasp 
the competences that the directors possesses and the index misses several importance diversity 
and competence factors such as earlier experiences. We argue that a score for previous work 
experience would increase the accuracy of the index. This would include in which areas, 
industries or positions the director have had before. However, it is easy to understand why this is 
excluded since it is hard to construct a replicable method to score work experience.  
 
Earlier studies have shown that an ethical mixture in a group can improve the performance of the 
group and so a good idea would be to somehow measure this in a diversity index. It could be hard 
to determine what ethical background a directors has without making individual interviews. 
Thus, as in many other cases, it could be hard and cumbersome to get good data on a large 
amount of companies.  
 
It should here also be stated that the Folksam report could be biased which should be taken into 
consideration when looking at the index. As a major institutional investor Folksam could have a 
hidden agenda, trying to show that a more diversified board is better as that could be better in 
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line with their viewpoint. When using the Folksam index one should therefore be careful when 
drawing conclusions from the index. 
 
These limitations in the index may have affected the statistical results negatively, making it 
harder to grasp the actual diversity level in the board of directors. Further, to capture diversity 
differences over time is hard due to the limited sensitivity in the construction of the scoring 
system of the variables which also adds to the limitations of the index.   
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8. Conclusion 
The purpose with this thesis is to study whether diversity in board of directors in Swedish Large 
Cap firms’ will create better financial performance in companies. In the following chapter the 
conclusions that have been drawn is presented, followed by suggestions for further research and 
recommendations regarding the Folksam report.  
 
This study has been trying to answer the complex question if diversity creates better financial 
performance in a company. To be able to answer this question a replica study of the Folksam 
competence report has been made. On top of this, the replicated Folksam index has been 
compared to financial performance measures to see if better diversity creates better performance. 
This has shown to be very hard to fully grasp. The initial question in this study was as follows: 
 
“Does diversity regarding gender, age, education and tenure in board of directors in Swedish 
Large Cap companies create better financial performance in terms of market-to-book value and 
return on assets?” 
 
The statistical test that has been conducted to try to answer this question has not been able to give 
any results at a significant level. The study has therefore not been able to give any statistically 
proved results to the questions if diversity gives better financial performance.  
 
The study has shown the complexity of the field, the problems in creating a good index and 
weaknesses in the Folksam diversity index. In collecting the data for the statistical test we have 
been able to get a diversity score that is similar to the one presented by Folksam, as seen in 
appendix D. However there are always judgments involved when quantifying data, such as 
education, which reduce the reliability of the study. Below the different aspects this study can 
answer will be highlighted. 
 
To carry through the study a null hypothesis was formulated as follows: “A more diversified 
board of directors will yield a higher financial performance”. The statistical test did not end up in 
any statistical significant results. The few significant results that could be found provided no 
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pattern regarding distribution in time or in different variables. Instead the conclusion is that the 
few significant results identified in the Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are 
random in their distribution and frequency. The insignificance in the statistical test does not make 
it possible to reject the hypothesis. Thus, it is not proven to be false and it could be true. The risk 
of making a type I error, that is rejecting a true hypothesis, means that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. By not rejecting the hypothesis the study is left with the risk of making a type II 
error, meaning that the statistical tests fails to reject a null hypothesis that is false. To reduce the 
risk of making a type I and a type II error, further research investigating the relationship between 
a broad diversity measure and financial performance is needed. This research should consist of a 
larger sample and a longer time horizon. The field would also benefit from case studies, 
providing a more accurate diversity measure.  
 
Due to the limited amount of statistically significant results in this study it has not been possible 
to draw any empirical conclusions regarding the causality of diversity in board of directors. It is 
argued in the analysis that financially successful firms would be more comfortable and more 
willing to let in minority directors in the board of directors. However, this view does not find any 
support in the statistical tests. Further statistical test should be made to see if financially 
successful firms have a higher level of diversity in their board of directors.  
 
The theoretical field of corporate governance and more specific the field of diversity within 
corporate governance has shown to be very complex. Not only because the theories are often 
only focused on one specific part of the whole corporate governance painting but the painting 
also lack parts that needs to be seen to get the whole picture. This study has not been able to paint 
the parts that are missing with great precision but it has been able to show that the painting is not 
very detailed and needs a lot of work before it can be exhibited and consumed. 
 
The major part that is adding to the complexity in this painting is the information needed to 
actually create the possibility to paint the picture. The field has been working with only one color 
for a long time, namely the diversity expressed as the proportion of women relative to men. In 
later stages other, single, measures of diversity has been tested and in some rare cases the 
painters has even began to mix the different colors to get a richer color scheme to work with. 
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This study has made a try to mix even more colors into the blend to get a richer palette to work 
with. Although it has failed to get any statistical results with significance out of the mixture, the 
study can help further researchers to get a glance of how the field can be taken to the next level. 
 
Further, this study has not been able to answer if the board composition affects the companies’ 
performance at all. Earlier studies, such as Zahra and Pearce, can show that there is a connection 
between good and effective work in the board room and firm performance. What cannot be 
shown are what factors that actually create good and effective work in the board room. Here is a 
problem with the picture again, the field has the canvas but the picture is blurry and needs 
sharpness. This study has given the field a richer palette to work with although it cannot give any 
definite conclusion to the question it tries to answer. 
 
The many aspects of diversity that are declared in the academic literature provide a wide concept 
that is hard to get into an index. As discussed throughout this thesis the diversity index provided 
by Folksam is a good attempt to put the aspects of diversity into numbers but clearly it has its 
limitations. These limitations reduce the validity in this study as well as the study made by 
Folksam. What is especially hard to achieve is the mix of different variables that are to be 
transformed into a numeric value that can be ranked. A majority of the previous research focuses 
on the distribution of men and women, this is understandable since it is easy to replicate and 
quantify. Other factors are harder to quantify in a replicable way in an objective manner. This 
affects the statistical results as the companies are hard to separate from each other.  
 
A better index construction would be more sensitive and capture more variables of diversity such 
as ethnicity and work experience. Further, by calculating diversity score with the median value as 
base the scoring might become biased and skewed as has been discussed earlier. The conclusion 
is that the scoring of individual variables must be more accurate.  
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8.1 General sightings within the field 
During the study the authors has been able to find some interesting sightings, these will be 
presented below.  
 
The first is connected to the general society. During the early gathering of information to the 
background a clear pressure from the society to increase the diversity in corporate boards could 
be found. The majority of the findings were pointing on the fact that there, to a large extent, only 
exist men in the fifties in the boards. Some countries, for example Norway, took legislation as a 
measure to increase the number of women in the board of directors. In this study the authors want 
to take the focus away from the women/men quota discussion and try to expand the definition of 
diversity to incorporate more variables. This study indicate that there are more to diversity than 
just men/women, thus the society should not be blinded by this discussion but instead develop it. 
 
What has also been noted is the fact that when women enters the board room it is often in 
addition to the men or women that already is in the board. That is, the board is extended to add 
women and thus the men/women ratio does not increase as much as it could have done. This is 
not a problem in itself but it gives an explanation to why we do not see any major changes in the 
relative board composition when it comes to men and women.  
8.2 Suggestions for further research 
This study has clearly shown that there is a lot to be done within the field of diversity and board 
of directors, it has stretched the limits in the field but has not been able to confirm its hypothesis.  
 
To identify which variables that is important for the level of diversity the authors suggest future 
case studies on the conditions in the board of directors. Further, the authors hope is that a larger 
study can be done, that would give a better chance to confirm or reject the hypothesis of this 
study. Larger studies could also group companies into different industries and in that way 
identify any differences between different industries. Other groupings that could be of interest are 
for example large/small companies. This would give an answer to the questions if large 
companies are more restrictive to change in the board rooms than small agile companies. 
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A study covering more performance measures would also be a suggestion for future studies in the 
field. Return on assets and market-to-book value cannot show the full performance of the firm 
and both measures are also subject to earnings management. This is a problem when comparing a 
large amount of firms as the ones working with earnings management will have a higher ROA 
and MTBV than the ones that are not. Thus, with more performance measures a study would get 
better accuracy and be less fragile to things like earnings management. 
 
As stated above this study has not been able to conclude if financial performance leads to a 
higher level of diversity in the board of directors or if the relationship is contrary. Further 
research could consist of statistical studies investigating if financially successful firms have a 
more diversified board of directors.  
8.3 Recommendations 
Throughout the work with this thesis the authors have observed weaknesses in the Folksam 
report and the diversity index it provides. By the following recommendations the authors hope 
that those concerned can benefit from this study and improve the index in the future.  
 
The Folksam report shows that there is more to diversity than just gender but even though it has 
four different variables there is even more hidden in the term diversity. The most obvious things 
the authors has found missing are variables measuring the cultural differences in the board room, 
ethnicity and work experience. An index with these variables added would give a sharper picture 
of the word diversity and could better explain why a well-diversified board performs as it does. 
The problems in creating such a large index is of course many but with more time it is not 
impossible in any way. 
 
Further, by using the median value when calculating the diversity score the index misses a deeper 
knowledge about the level of diversity, as explained above. The authors see a possibility to 
construct an index with the absolute differences in age to better capture the level of diversity.  
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To benefit fully from the Folksam report requires the reader to have a critical approach to the 
information provided. The reader must be aware of the limitations in the construction of the 
index and that the results could be biased. Further one must recognize a political agenda from the 
author and Folksam that is a large institutional owner with origin of the cooperative federation.  
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10. Appendix 
10.1 Appendix A - The diversity index 2005 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
ABB 1,00 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,33 
Alfa Laval 0,60 0,33 0,33 0,60 0,47 
Alliance Oil 0,67 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,29 
Assa Abloy 0,60 0,14 0,67 0,33 0,44 
Astra Zeneca 0,71 0,40 0,83 1,00 0,74 
Atlas Copco 0,50 0,29 0,50 0,80 0,52 
Autoliv 0,10 0,00 0,33 0,83 0,32 
Axfood 1,00 0,60 0,50 0,33 0,61 
Boliden 0,60 0,33 0,67 0,60 0,55 
Castellum 0,40 0,40 0,33 0,40 0,38 
Electrolux 0,25 0,67 0,33 0,67 0,48 
Elekta 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Ericsson 0,80 0,13 0,50 0,50 0,48 
Fabege 0,17 0,17 0,50 0,75 0,40 
Getinge 0,00 0,40 0,50 0,75 0,41 
Hakon Invest 1,00 0,14 0,50 0,60 0,56 
Hennes & Mauritz 0,17 0,17 0,50 0,00 0,21 
Hexagon 0,50 0,20 0,33 0,20 0,31 
Holmen 0,80 0,13 0,67 0,50 0,52 
Hufvudstaden N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Husqvarna N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Industrivärden 0,60 0,14 0,33 1,00 0,52 
Investor 0,33 0,14 0,33 1,00 0,45 
Kinnevik 1,00 0,20 0,50 1,00 0,68 
Latour 1,00 0,33 0,33 0,60 0,57 
Lundbergföretagen 0,60 0,14 0,33 0,33 0,35 
Lundin Mining 0,80 0,00 0,50 0,80 0,53 
Lundin Petroleum 0,80 0,13 0,50 0,13 0,39 
Meda 0,00 0,00 0,67 0,00 0,17 
Melker Schörling N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Millicom 0,50 0,29 0,50 0,29 0,39 
MTG 0,33 0,14 0,33 1,00 0,45 
NCC 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,75 0,54 
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Appendix A - Continued 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
Nordea Bank 0,38 0,57 0,50 0,83 0,57 
Oriflame 0,60 0,33 0,50 0,60 0,51 
Peab 1,00 0,20 0,50 0,50 0,55 
Ratos 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,14 0,35 
SAAB 0,80 0,13 0,50 0,80 0,56 
Sandvik 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,60 0,46 
SCA 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,75 0,50 
Scania 0,50 0,13 0,33 0,50 0,36 
SEB 1,00 0,43 0,50 0,43 0,59 
Seco Tools 1,00 0,14 0,50 0,33 0,49 
Securitas 0,80 0,29 0,50 0,50 0,52 
Skanska 0,50 0,29 0,50 0,80 0,52 
SKF 0,60 0,33 0,33 0,60 0,47 
SSAB 0,33 0,14 0,33 0,60 0,35 
Stora Enso 0,43 0,11 0,50 1,00 0,51 
Sv. Handelsbanken 0,33 0,33 0,50 0,71 0,47 
Swedbank 0,29 0,80 0,50 0,80 0,60 
Tele2 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,75 0,50 
Telia Sonera 0,60 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,40 
Tieto Oyj 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,75 0,50 
Volvo 0,14 0,33 0,50 0,14 0,28 
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10.2 Appendix B - The diversity index 2007 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
ABB 0,60 0,00 0,33 0,14 0,27 
Alfa Laval 0,60 0,33 0,33 0,60 0,47 
Alliance Oil 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,25 
Assa Abloy 1,00 0,14 0,67 0,60 0,60 
Astra Zeneca 1,00 0,33 0,83 0,83 0,75 
Atlas Copco 0,75 0,29 0,33 0,17 0,38 
Autoliv 0,20 0,00 0,33 0,71 0,31 
Axfood 0,00 0,75 0,50 0,00 0,31 
Boliden 1,00 0,33 0,50 0,60 0,61 
Castellum 0,75 0,40 0,33 0,75 0,56 
Electrolux 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 
Elekta 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,17 0,40 
Ericsson 1,00 0,25 0,50 1,00 0,69 
Fabege 1,00 0,33 0,33 1,00 0,67 
Getinge 0,17 0,40 0,50 0,75 0,45 
Hakon Invest 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Hennes & Mauritz 0,60 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,48 
Hexagon 0,67 0,00 0,33 0,67 0,42 
Holmen 0,80 0,13 0,67 0,80 0,60 
Hufvudstaden 0,50 0,29 0,67 0,50 0,49 
Husqvarna 0,80 0,29 0,33 0,13 0,39 
Industrivärden 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,33 0,39 
Investor 0,67 0,43 0,33 1,00 0,61 
Kinnevik 0,50 0,20 0,33 0,50 0,38 
Latour 1,00 0,33 0,33 0,14 0,45 
Lundbergföretagen 0,60 0,14 0,33 0,33 0,35 
Lundin Mining 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,80 0,45 
Lundin Petroleum 0,67 0,17 0,50 0,00 0,33 
Meda 0,00 0,20 0,50 0,50 0,30 
Melker Schörling 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Millicom 1,00 1,00 0,17 0,50 0,67 
MTG 0,14 0,33 0,33 0,60 0,35 
NCC 0,50 0,20 0,50 0,20 0,35 
Nordea Bank 0,38 0,38 0,33 0,57 0,41 
Oriflame 0,50 0,50 0,33 0,50 0,46 
Peab 1,00 0,20 0,50 0,50 0,55 
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Appendix B - Continued 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
Ratos 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,33 0,39 
SAAB 0,80 0,13 0,50 0,80 0,56 
Sandvik 0,60 0,33 0,50 0,33 0,44 
SCA 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,40 0,41 
Scania 0,80 0,13 0,33 0,29 0,39 
SEB 1,00 0,43 0,50 0,43 0,59 
Seco Tools 1,00 0,33 0,50 0,29 0,53 
Securitas 1,00 0,43 0,50 0,67 0,65 
Skanska 0,29 0,13 0,50 0,80 0,43 
SKF 0,43 0,43 0,33 1,00 0,55 
SSAB 0,60 0,14 0,33 1,00 0,52 
Stora Enso 0,29 0,29 0,67 0,80 0,51 
Sv. Handelsbanken 0,50 0,30 0,50 0,20 0,38 
Swedbank 0,29 0,80 0,50 0,80 0,60 
Tele2 0,50 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,63 
Telia Sonera 0,75 0,40 0,50 0,40 0,51 
Tieto Oyj 0,40 0,17 0,33 0,75 0,41 
Volvo 0,29 0,13 0,67 0,80 0,47 
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10.3 Appendix C - The diversity index 2009 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
ABB 0,33 0,00 0,33 0,14 0,20 
Alfa Laval 1,00 0,33 0,33 1,00 0,67 
Alliance Oil 0,75 0,00 0,50 0,75 0,50 
Assa Abloy 0,80 0,29 0,67 0,50 0,56 
Astra Zeneca 1,00 0,33 0,83 1,00 0,79 
Atlas Copco 0,50 0,29 0,33 0,80 0,48 
Autoliv 0,10 0,00 0,33 0,57 0,25 
Axfood 0,17 0,75 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Boliden 1,00 0,33 0,50 0,33 0,54 
Castellum 0,60 0,33 0,50 1,00 0,61 
Electrolux 0,80 0,50 0,50 0,80 0,65 
Elekta 1,00 0,33 0,67 0,40 0,60 
Ericsson 0,67 0,25 0,50 0,43 0,46 
Fabege 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,40 0,41 
Getinge 0,75 0,40 0,50 0,17 0,45 
Hakon Invest 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Hennes & Mauritz 0,80 0,50 0,67 0,50 0,62 
Hexagon 0,67 0,25 0,33 0,67 0,48 
Holmen 0,50 0,13 0,67 0,29 0,39 
Hufvudstaden 0,80 0,29 0,67 0,50 0,56 
Husqvarna 0,80 0,29 0,33 0,00 0,35 
Industrivärden 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,33 0,39 
Investor 0,67 0,43 0,33 1,00 0,61 
Kinnevik 0,40 0,17 0,50 0,75 0,45 
Latour 0,40 0,40 0,50 0,17 0,37 
Lundbergföretagen 0,33 0,14 0,33 0,33 0,29 
Lundin Mining 0,43 0,00 0,50 1,00 0,48 
Lundin Petroleum 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Meda 0,40 0,40 0,50 0,75 0,51 
Melker Schörling 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,40 0,45 
Millicom 0,75 0,40 0,17 0,75 0,52 
MTG 0,33 0,33 0,33 1,00 0,50 
NCC 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,20 0,43 
Nordea Bank 1,00 0,43 0,50 0,43 0,59 
Oriflame 0,50 0,50 0,33 0,50 0,46 
Peab 0,75 0,17 0,50 0,33 0,44 
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Appendix C - Continued 
 
Company Age Gender Education Tenure Index 
Ratos 1,00 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,58 
SAAB 1,00 0,11 0,50 0,43 0,51 
Sandvik 1,00 0,14 0,50 0,60 0,56 
SCA 0,60 0,14 0,50 0,60 0,46 
Scania 0,43 0,11 0,33 0,67 0,38 
SEB 0,57 0,57 0,50 0,22 0,47 
Seco Tools 1,00 0,14 0,50 0,29 0,48 
Securitas 0,50 0,50 0,33 0,50 0,46 
Skanska 0,60 0,00 0,50 0,33 0,36 
SKF 0,80 0,50 0,33 0,80 0,61 
SSAB 0,29 0,13 0,33 0,50 0,31 
Stora Enso 0,50 0,29 0,67 0,50 0,49 
Sv. Handelsbanken 0,50 0,33 0,50 0,33 0,42 
Swedbank 0,60 1,00 0,50 0,60 0,68 
Tele2 0,33 0,33 0,67 1,00 0,58 
Telia Sonera 1,00 0,33 0,50 0,60 0,61 
Tieto Oyj 0,75 0,17 0,33 0,75 0,50 
Volvo 0,29 0,13 0,67 0,50 0,39 
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10.4 Appendix D - Reliability report 
 
 Company Index 2009 Folksam index 2009 Difference 
ABB 0,20 0,22 -0,02 
Alfa Laval 0,67 0,73 -0,06 
Alliance Oil 0,50 0,46 0,04 
Assa Abloy 0,56 0,48 0,08 
Astra Zeneca 0,79 0,67 0,12 
Atlas Copco 0,48 0,46 0,02 
Autoliv 0,25 0,32 -0,07 
Axfood 0,45 0,45 0,00 
Boliden 0,54 0,44 0,10 
Castellum 0,61 0,56 0,05 
Electrolux 0,65 0,67 -0,02 
Elekta 0,60 0,55 0,05 
Ericsson 0,46 0,60 -0,14 
Fabege 0,41 0,46 -0,05 
Getinge 0,45 0,54 -0,09 
Hakon Invest 0,45 0,40 0,05 
Hennes & Mauritz 0,62 0,68 -0,06 
Hexagon 0,48 0,50 -0,02 
Holmen 0,39 0,30 0,09 
Hufvudstaden 0,56 0,52 0,04 
Husqvarna 0,35 0,40 -0,05 
Industrivärden 0,39 0,28 0,11 
Investor 0,61 0,61 0,00 
Kinnevik 0,45 0,45 0,00 
Latour 0,37 0,47 -0,10 
Lundbergföretagen 0,29 0,40 -0,11 
Lundin Mining 0,48 0,39 0,09 
Lundin Petroleum 0,45 0,45 0,00 
Meda 0,51 0,51 0,00 
Melker Schörling 0,45 0,43 0,02 
Millicom 0,52 0,63 -0,11 
MTG 0,50 0,50 0,00 
NCC 0,43 0,43 -0,01 
Nordea Bank 0,59 0,51 0,08 
Oriflame 0,46 0,50 -0,04 
Peab 0,44 0,45 -0,01 
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Appendix D - Continued 
 
 Company Index 2009 Folksam index 2009 Difference 
Ratos 0,58 0,61 -0,03 
SAAB 0,51 0,47 0,04 
Sandvik 0,56 0,56 0,00 
SCA 0,46 0,46 0,00 
Scania 0,38 0,28 0,10 
SEB 0,47 0,42 0,05 
Seco Tools 0,48 0,48 0,00 
Securitas 0,46 0,49 -0,03 
Skanska 0,36 0,36 0,00 
SKF 0,61 0,53 0,08 
SSAB 0,31 0,31 0,00 
Stora Enso 0,49 0,43 0,06 
Sv. Handelsbanken 0,42 0,42 0,00 
Swedbank 0,68 0,71 -0,03 
Tele2 0,58 0,48 0,10 
Telia Sonera 0,61 0,51 0,10 
Tieto Oyj 0,50 0,41 0,09 
Volvo 0,39 0,54 -0,15 
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10.5 Appendix E - Gathering of data 
 
 
 
  
Gathering of 
annual reports 
• Reports were gathered from each of the 54 companies’ websites, if the 
annual reports were not available online they were ordered. 
Age 
• The age of each directors is gathered. The age or year of birth is stated in the 
annual reports. 
 
Education 
• The education of the directors is determined and gathered. If the 
information was not available in the annual report other sources were used. 
 
Gender 
• The gender of the directors is stated in the annual report and was gathered 
from it. 
 
Tenure 
• The directors tenure was calculated with information from the annual report. 
 
Construction 
of index 
• The different variables was composed to an index where all variables had the 
same weight.  
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10.6 Appendix F – Statistical tests of index 
 
Index & MTBV 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
MTBV_05 Low diversity 25 27,52 688,00    
High diversity 25 23,48 587,00    
Total 50        
MTBV_06 Low diversity 25 28,50 712,50    
High diversity 26 23,60 613,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_07 Low diversity 25 28,00 700,00    
High diversity 26 24,08 626,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_08 Low diversity 25 28,98 724,50    
High diversity 26 23,13 601,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_09 Low diversity 25 30,40 760,00    
High diversity 26 21,77 566,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_10 Low diversity 25 29,48 737,00    
High diversity 26 22,65 589,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Mann-Whitney U 262,000 262,500 275,000 250,500 215,000 238,000  
Wilcoxon W 587,000 613,500 626,000 601,500 566,000 589,000  
Z -,980 -1,178 -,942 -1,404 -2,073 -1,639  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,327 ,239 ,346 ,160  ,038 ,101  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,320 ,225 ,222 ,329 ,372 ,334 
Positive ,080 ,225 ,222 ,329 ,372 ,334 
Negative -,320 -,038 -,077 -,083 -,114 -,038 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,131 ,802 ,791 1,175 1,329 1,192 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,155 ,541 ,559 ,126 ,058 ,117 
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Index & ROA 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
ROA_05 Low diversity 25 25,16 629,00    
High diversity 25 25,84 646,00    
Total 50        
ROA_06 Low diversity 25 25,88 647,00    
High diversity 25 25,12 628,00    
Total 50        
ROA_07 Low diversity 25 29,00 725,00    
High diversity 26 23,12 601,00    
Total 51        
ROA_08 Low diversity 25 28,80 720,00    
High diversity 26 23,31 606,00    
Total 51        
ROA_09 Low diversity 25 24,24 606,00    
High diversity 26 27,69 720,00    
Total 51        
ROA_10 Low diversity 25 28,60 715,00    
High diversity 26 23,50 611,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10  
Mann-Whitney U 304,000 303,000 250,000 255,000 281,000 260,000  
Wilcoxon W 629,000 628,000 601,000 606,000 606,000 611,000  
Z -,165 -,184 -1,413 -1,319 -,829 -1,225  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,869 ,854 ,158 ,187 ,407 ,221  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,160 ,320 ,298 ,331 ,211 ,337 
Positive ,160 ,280 ,298 ,331 ,052 ,337 
Negative -,120 -,320 -,109 -,035 -,211 -,106 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,566 1,131 1,066 1,181 ,752 1,203 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,906 ,155 ,206 ,123 ,623 ,111 
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2007 Index & MTBV      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
MTBV07 Low diversity 27 27,85 752,00  
High diversity 27 27,15 733,00  
Total 54      
MTBV08 Low diversity 27 30,26 817,00  
High diversity 27 24,74 668,00  
Total 54      
MTBV09 Low diversity 27 27,98 755,50  
High diversity 27 27,02 729,50  
Total 54      
MTBV10 Low diversity 27 28,93 781,00  
High diversity 27 26,07 704,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10  
Mann-Whitney U 355,000 290,000 351,500 326,000  
Wilcoxon W 733,000 668,000 729,500 704,000  
Z -,164 -1,289 -,225 -,666  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,869 ,197 ,822 ,505  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,185 ,259 ,185 ,259 
Positive ,185 ,037 ,074 ,111 
Negative -,185 -,259 -,185 -,259 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,680 ,953 ,680 ,953 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,744 ,324 ,744 ,324 
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2007 Index & ROA      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
ROA07 Low diversity 27 28,67 774,00  
High diversity 27 26,33 711,00  
Total 54      
ROA08 Low diversity 27 28,89 780,00  
High diversity 27 26,11 705,00  
Total 54      
ROA09 Low diversity 27 29,63 800,00  
High diversity 27 25,37 685,00  
Total 54      
ROA10 Low diversity 27 29,48 796,00  
High diversity 27 25,52 689,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10  
Mann-Whitney U 333,000 327,000 307,000 311,000  
Wilcoxon W 711,000 705,000 685,000 689,000  
Z -,545 -,649 -,995 -,926  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,586 ,517 ,320 ,355  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,222 ,222 ,222 ,222 
Positive ,111 ,111 ,074 ,037 
Negative -,222 -,222 -,222 -,222 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,816 ,816 ,816 ,816 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,518 ,518 ,518 ,518 
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Index & MTBV 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
MTBV_09 Low diversity 26 25,52 663,50 
High diversity 28 29,34 821,50 
Total 54     
MTBV_10 Low diversity 26 24,42 635,00 
High diversity 28 30,36 850,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10   
Mann-Whitney U 312,500 284,000   
Wilcoxon W 663,500 635,000   
Z -,892 -1,385   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,373 ,166   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,217 ,239  
Positive ,107 ,038  
Negative -,217 -,239  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,797 ,878  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,549 ,424  
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Index & ROA 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
ROA_09 Low diversity 26 26,46 688,00 
High diversity 28 28,46 797,00 
Total 54     
ROA_10 Low diversity 26 23,65 615,00 
High diversity 28 31,07 870,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  ROA_09 ROA_10   
Mann-Whitney U 337,000 264,000   
Wilcoxon W 688,000 615,000   
Z -,467 -1,731   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,640   ,083   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_09 ROA_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,198 ,335  
Positive ,115 ,049  
Negative -,198 -,335  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,726 1,231  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,667 ,097  
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10.7 Appendix G - Statistical tests of age 
 
Age & MTBV 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
MTBV_05 Low diversity 30 24,00 720,00    
High diversity 20 27,75 555,00    
Total 50        
MTBV_06 Low diversity 30 25,25 757,50    
High diversity 21 27,07 568,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_07 Low diversity 30 25,38 761,50    
High diversity 21 26,88 564,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_08 Low diversity 30 25,27 758,00    
High diversity 21 27,05 568,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_09 Low diversity 30 25,63 769,00    
High diversity 21 26,52 557,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_10 Low diversity 30 25,93 778,00    
High diversity 21 26,10 548,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Mann-Whitney U 255,000 292,500 296,500 293,000 304,000 313,000  
Wilcoxon W 720,000 757,500 761,500 758,000 769,000 778,000  
Z -,891 -,431 -,354 -,421 -,211 -,038  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,373 ,667 ,723 ,674 ,833 ,969  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,267 ,162 ,143 ,176 ,152 ,138 
Positive ,267 ,162 ,143 ,176 ,152 ,138 
Negative -,133 -,095 -,057 -,114 -,076 -,133 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,924 ,569 ,502 ,619 ,536 ,485 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,361 ,902 ,963 ,838 ,937 ,973 
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Age & ROA 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
ROA_05 Low diversity 30 25,40 762,00    
High diversity 20 25,65 513,00    
Total 50        
ROA_06 Low diversity 30 26,63 799,00    
High diversity 20 23,80 476,00    
Total 50        
ROA_07 Low diversity 30 27,40 822,00    
High diversity 21 24,00 504,00    
Total 51        
ROA_08 Low diversity 30 26,53 796,00    
High diversity 21 25,24 530,00    
Total 51        
ROA_09 Low diversity 30 24,30 729,00    
High diversity 21 28,43 597,00    
Total 51        
ROA_10 Low diversity 30 27,33 820,00    
High diversity 21 24,10 506,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10  
Mann-Whitney U 297,000 266,000 273,000 299,000 264,000 275,000  
Wilcoxon W 762,000 476,000 504,000 530,000 729,000 506,000  
Z -,059 -,673 -,804 -,306 -,976 -,766  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,953 ,501 ,421 ,759 ,329 ,444  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,167 ,217 ,200 ,195 ,238 ,210 
Positive ,167 ,067 ,038 ,119 ,238 ,043 
Negative -,133 -,217 -,200 -,195 -,119 -,210 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,577 ,751 ,703 ,686 ,837 ,736 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,893 ,626 ,706 ,734 ,486 ,650 
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2007 Age & MTBV      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
MTBV07 Low diversity 29 26,66 773,00  
High diversity 25 28,48 712,00  
Total 54      
MTBV08 Low diversity 29 28,47 825,50  
High diversity 25 26,38 659,50  
Total 54      
MTBV09 Low diversity 29 27,74 804,50  
High diversity 25 27,22 680,50  
Total 54      
MTBV10 Low diversity 29 28,12 815,50  
High diversity 25 26,78 669,50  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10  
Mann-Whitney U 338,000 334,500 355,500 344,500  
Wilcoxon W 773,000 659,500 680,500 669,500  
Z -,425 -,486 -,121 -,312  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,671 ,627 ,903 ,755  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,124 ,177 ,137 ,156 
Positive ,124 ,084 ,137 ,127 
Negative -,077 -,177 -,130 -,156 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,455 ,647 ,500 ,571 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,986 ,797 ,964 ,900 
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2007 Age & ROA      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
ROA07 Low diversity 29 25,79 748,00  
High diversity 25 29,48 737,00  
Total 54      
ROA08 Low diversity 29 27,34 793,00  
High diversity 25 27,68 692,00  
Total 54      
ROA09 Low diversity 29 25,90 751,00  
High diversity 25 29,36 734,00  
Total 54      
ROA10 Low diversity 29 27,52 798,00  
High diversity 25 27,48 687,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10  
Mann-Whitney U 313,000 358,000 316,000 362,000  
Wilcoxon W 748,000 793,000 751,000 687,000  
Z -,859 -,078 -,807 -,009  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,391 ,938 ,420 ,993  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,225 ,127 ,230 ,135 
Positive ,225 ,127 ,230 ,135 
Negative -,103 -,110 -,116 -,127 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,824 ,465 ,844 ,495 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,506 ,982 ,474 ,967 
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Age & MTBV 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
MTBV_09 Low diversity 26 23,75 617,50 
High diversity 28 30,98 867,50 
Total 54     
MTBV_10 Low diversity 26 22,62 588,00 
High diversity 28 32,04 897,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10   
Mann-Whitney U 266,500 237,000   
Wilcoxon W 617,500 588,000   
Z -1,688 -2,199   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,091   ,028   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,332 ,409  
Positive ,038 ,038  
Negative -,332 -,409  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,221 1,503  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,102   ,022  
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Age & ROA 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
ROA_09 Low diversity 26 24,69 642,00 
High diversity 28 30,11 843,00 
Total 54     
ROA_10 Low diversity 26 25,46 662,00 
High diversity 28 29,39 823,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  ROA_09 ROA_10   
Mann-Whitney U 291,000 311,000   
Wilcoxon W 642,000 662,000   
Z -1,264 -,918   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,206 ,359   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_09 ROA_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,245 ,212  
Positive ,041 ,085  
Negative -,245 -,212  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,898 ,777  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,396 ,582  
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10.8 Appendix H - Statistical tests of education 
 
2005 Education & MTBV       
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
MTBV_05 Low diversity 18 20,17 363,00    
High diversity 32 28,50 912,00    
Total 50        
MTBV_06 Low diversity 18 21,39 385,00    
High diversity 33 28,52 941,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_07 Low diversity 18 20,44 368,00    
High diversity 33 29,03 958,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_08 Low diversity 18 25,14 452,50    
High diversity 33 26,47 873,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_09 Low diversity 18 23,94 431,00    
High diversity 33 27,12 895,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_10 Low diversity 18 24,14 434,50    
High diversity 33 27,02 891,50    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Mann-Whitney U 192,000 214,000 197,000 281,500 260,000 263,500  
Wilcoxon W 363,000 385,000 368,000 452,500 431,000 434,500  
Z -1,940 -1,636 -1,971 -,306 -,729 -,660  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,052 ,102   ,049 ,760 ,466 ,509  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,358 ,253 ,298 ,177 ,268 ,202 
Positive ,000 ,061 ,030 ,177 ,182 ,045 
Negative -,358 -,253 -,298 -,146 -,268 -,202 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,214 ,862 1,017 ,603 ,914 ,689 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,105 ,448 ,252 ,860 ,374 ,729 
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Education & ROA 2005       
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
ROA_05 Low diversity 18 25,39 457,00    
High diversity 32 25,56 818,00    
Total 50        
ROA_06 Low diversity 18 25,94 467,00    
High diversity 32 25,25 808,00    
Total 50        
ROA_07 Low diversity 18 23,89 430,00    
High diversity 33 27,15 896,00    
Total 51        
ROA_08 Low diversity 18 27,22 490,00    
High diversity 33 25,33 836,00    
Total 51        
ROA_09 Low diversity 18 26,11 470,00    
High diversity 33 25,94 856,00    
Total 51        
ROA_10 Low diversity 18 27,67 498,00    
High diversity 33 25,09 828,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10  
Mann-Whitney U 286,000 280,000 259,000 275,000 295,000 267,000  
Wilcoxon W 457,000 808,000 430,000 836,000 856,000 828,000  
Z -,040 -,162 -,749 -,434 -,039 -,591  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,968 ,872 ,454 ,665 ,969 ,554  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,205 ,219 ,172 ,283 ,152 ,157 
Positive ,156 ,184 ,121 ,283 ,121 ,157 
Negative -,205 -,219 -,172 -,131 -,152 -,061 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,695 ,742 ,586 ,965 ,517 ,534 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,719 ,640 ,882 ,309 ,952 ,938 
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2007 Education & MTBV     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
MTBV07 Low diversity 21 24,83 521,50  
High diversity 33 29,20 963,50  
Total 54      
MTBV08 Low diversity 21 26,43 555,00  
High diversity 33 28,18 930,00  
Total 54      
MTBV09 Low diversity 21 25,43 534,00  
High diversity 33 28,82 951,00  
Total 54      
MTBV10 Low diversity 21 26,31 552,50  
High diversity 33 28,26 932,50  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10  
Mann-Whitney U 290,500 324,000 303,000 321,500  
Wilcoxon W 521,500 555,000 534,000 552,500  
Z -,994 -,399 -,772 -,444  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,320 ,690 ,440 ,657  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,221 ,225 ,251 ,173 
Positive ,048 ,139 ,104 ,065 
Negative -,221 -,225 -,251 -,173 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,791 ,806 ,899 ,620 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,559 ,534 ,393 ,836 
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2007 Education & ROA     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
ROA07 Low diversity 21 31,81 668,00  
High diversity 33 24,76 817,00  
Total 54      
ROA08 Low diversity 21 30,90 649,00  
High diversity 33 25,33 836,00  
Total 54      
ROA09 Low diversity 21 27,52 578,00  
High diversity 33 27,48 907,00  
Total 54      
ROA10 Low diversity 21 29,00 609,00  
High diversity 33 26,55 876,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10  
Mann-Whitney U 256,000 275,000 346,000 315,000  
Wilcoxon W 817,000 836,000 907,000 876,000  
Z -1,606 -1,269 -,009 -,559  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,108 ,205 ,993 ,576  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,325 ,312 ,152 ,143 
Positive ,325 ,312 ,121 ,143 
Negative -,030 -,056 -,152 -,061 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,163 1,117 ,543 ,512 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,134 ,165 ,930 ,956 
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Education & MTBV 2009    
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
MTBV_09 Low diversity 17 29,97 509,50 
High diversity 37 26,36 975,50 
Total 54     
MTBV_10 Low diversity 17 31,32 532,50 
High diversity 37 25,74 952,50 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10   
Mann-Whitney U 272,500 249,500   
Wilcoxon W 975,500 952,500   
Z -,782 -1,211   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,434 ,226   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,281 ,291  
Positive ,281 ,291  
Negative -,103 -,095  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,960 ,993  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,315 ,278  
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Education & ROA 2009   
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
ROA_09 Low diversity 17 28,35 482,00 
High diversity 37 27,11 1003,00 
Total 54     
ROA_10 Low diversity 17 31,06 528,00 
High diversity 37 25,86 957,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  ROA_09 ROA_10   
Mann-Whitney U 300,000 254,000   
Wilcoxon W 1003,000 957,000   
Z -,270 -1,127   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,787 ,260   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_09 ROA_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,137 ,205  
Positive ,137 ,205  
Negative -,108 -,054  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,467 ,700  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,981 ,711  
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10.9 Appendix I - Statistical tests of gender 
 
Gender & MTBV 2005       
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
MTBV_05 Low diversity 20 23,70 474,00    
High diversity 30 26,70 801,00    
Total 50        
MTBV_06 Low diversity 21 23,86 501,00    
High diversity 30 27,50 825,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_07 Low diversity 21 23,31 489,50    
High diversity 30 27,88 836,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_08 Low diversity 21 23,76 499,00    
High diversity 30 27,57 827,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_09 Low diversity 21 26,48 556,00    
High diversity 30 25,67 770,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_10 Low diversity 21 23,62 496,00    
High diversity 30 27,67 830,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Mann-Whitney U 264,000 270,000 258,500 268,000 305,000 265,000  
Wilcoxon W 474,000 501,000 489,500 499,000 770,000 496,000  
Z -,713 -,861 -1,081 -,900 -,191 -,957  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,476 ,389 ,280 ,368 ,848 ,339  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,200 ,176 ,210 ,219 ,138 ,195 
Positive ,133 ,043 ,033 ,033 ,138 ,043 
Negative -,200 -,176 -,210 -,219 -,086 -,195 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,693 ,619 ,736 ,770 ,485 ,686 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,723 ,838 ,650 ,594 ,973 ,734 
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Gender & ROA 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
ROA_05 Low diversity 21 27,67 581,00    
High diversity 29 23,93 694,00    
Total 50        
ROA_06 Low diversity 21 25,76 541,00    
High diversity 29 25,31 734,00    
Total 50        
ROA_07 Low diversity 21 24,43 513,00    
High diversity 30 27,10 813,00    
Total 51        
ROA_08 Low diversity 21 22,95 482,00    
High diversity 30 28,13 844,00    
Total 51        
ROA_09 Low diversity 21 20,90 439,00    
High diversity 30 29,57 887,00    
Total 51        
ROA_10 Low diversity 21 26,10 548,00    
High diversity 30 25,93 778,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10  
Mann-Whitney U 259,000 299,000 282,000 251,000 208,000 313,000  
Wilcoxon W 694,000 734,000 513,000 482,000 439,000 778,000  
Z -,894 -,108 -,632 -1,225 -2,048 -,038  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,371 ,914 ,528 ,221   ,041 ,969  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,269 ,207 ,186 ,252 ,433 ,138 
Positive ,269 ,172 ,143 ,010 ,048 ,138 
Negative -,095 -,207 -,186 -,252 -,433 -,095 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,940 ,722 ,653 ,887 1,523 ,485 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,340 ,674 ,788 ,411   ,019 ,973 
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2007 Gender & MTBV      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
MTBV07 Low diversity 26 24,44 635,50  
High diversity 28 30,34 849,50  
Total 54      
MTBV08 Low diversity 26 26,33 684,50  
High diversity 28 28,59 800,50  
Total 54      
MTBV09 Low diversity 26 25,06 651,50  
High diversity 28 29,77 833,50  
Total 54      
MTBV10 Low diversity 26 24,40 634,50  
High diversity 28 30,38 850,50  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10  
Mann-Whitney U 284,500 333,500 300,500 283,500  
Wilcoxon W 635,500 684,500 651,500 634,500  
Z -1,376 -,528 -1,099 -1,394  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,169 ,597 ,272 ,163  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,352 ,313 ,275 ,313 
Positive ,121 ,168 ,033 ,030 
Negative -,352 -,313 -,275 -,313 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,291 1,150 1,009 1,150 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,071 ,142 ,261 ,142 
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2007 Gender & ROA      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
ROA07 Low diversity 26 24,35 633,00  
High diversity 28 30,43 852,00  
Total 54      
ROA08 Low diversity 26 23,35 607,00  
High diversity 28 31,36 878,00  
Total 54      
ROA09 Low diversity 26 27,12 705,00  
High diversity 28 27,86 780,00  
Total 54      
ROA10 Low diversity 26 23,58 613,00  
High diversity 28 31,14 872,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10  
Mann-Whitney U 282,000 256,000 354,000 262,000  
Wilcoxon W 633,000 607,000 705,000 613,000  
Z -1,420 -1,870 -,173 -1,766  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,156 ,062 ,863 ,077  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,385 ,387 ,168 ,360 
Positive ,170 ,091 ,115 ,104 
Negative -,385 -,387 -,168 -,360 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,412 1,422 ,615 1,321 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   ,037   ,035 ,843 ,061 
 
  
104 
 
Gender & MTVB 2009    
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
MTBV_09 Low diversity 29 24,95 723,50 
High diversity 25 30,46 761,50 
Total 54     
MTBV_10 Low diversity 29 23,74 688,50 
High diversity 25 31,86 796,50 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10   
Mann-Whitney U 288,500 253,500   
Wilcoxon W 723,500 688,500   
Z -1,284 -1,891   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,199 ,059   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,268 ,302  
Positive ,268 ,302  
Negative -,046 -,006  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,980 1,107  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,292 ,172  
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Gender & ROA 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
ROA_09 Low diversity 29 24,28 704,00 
High diversity 25 31,24 781,00 
Total 54     
ROA_10 Low diversity 29 25,24 732,00 
High diversity 25 30,12 753,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  ROA_09 ROA_10   
Mann-Whitney U 269,000 297,000   
Wilcoxon W 704,000 732,000   
Z -1,622 -1,136   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,105 ,256   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_09 ROA_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,272 ,254  
Positive ,272 ,254  
Negative -,103 -,126  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,996 ,930  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,275 ,353  
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10.10 Appendix J - Statistical tests of tenure 
 
Tenure & MTBV 2005       
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
MTBV_05 Low diversity 22 29,27 644,00    
High diversity 28 22,54 631,00    
Total 50        
MTBV_06 Low diversity 22 31,43 691,50    
High diversity 29 21,88 634,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_07 Low diversity 22 30,84 678,50    
High diversity 29 22,33 647,50    
Total 51        
MTBV_08 Low diversity 22 30,09 662,00    
High diversity 29 22,90 664,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_09 Low diversity 22 32,95 725,00    
High diversity 29 20,72 601,00    
Total 51        
MTBV_10 Low diversity 22 30,55 672,00    
High diversity 29 22,55 654,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Mann-Whitney U 225,000 199,500 212,500 229,000 166,000 219,000  
Wilcoxon W 631,000 634,500 647,500 664,000 601,000 654,000  
Z -1,622 -2,273 -2,026 -1,712 -2,910 -1,902  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,105   ,023   ,043 ,087   ,004 ,057  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_05 MTBV_06 MTBV_07 MTBV_08 MTBV_09 MTBV_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,321 ,335 ,370 ,304 ,426 ,348 
Positive ,321 ,335 ,370 ,304 ,426 ,348 
Negative -,010 -,034 -,069 -,034 -,034 -,034 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,128 1,186 1,308 1,075 1,508 1,231 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,157 ,120 ,065 ,198   ,021 ,097 
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Tenure & ROA 2005        
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks    
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks    
ROA_05 Low diversity 21 23,57 495,00    
High diversity 29 26,90 780,00    
Total 50        
ROA_06 Low diversity 21 23,29 489,00    
High diversity 29 27,10 786,00    
Total 50        
ROA_07 Low diversity 22 27,45 604,00    
High diversity 29 24,90 722,00    
Total 51        
ROA_08 Low diversity 22 28,73 632,00    
High diversity 29 23,93 694,00    
Total 51        
ROA_09 Low diversity 22 26,36 580,00    
High diversity 29 25,72 746,00    
Total 51        
ROA_10 Low diversity 22 25,77 567,00    
High diversity 29 26,17 759,00    
Total 51        
        
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10  
Mann-Whitney U 264,000 258,000 287,000 259,000 311,000 314,000  
Wilcoxon W 495,000 489,000 722,000 694,000 746,000 567,000  
Z -,796 -,914 -,609 -1,141 -,152 -,095  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,426 ,361 ,543 ,254 ,879 ,924  
        
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_05 ROA_06 ROA_07 ROA_08 ROA_09 ROA_10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,279 ,335 ,265 ,277 ,132 ,163 
Positive ,112 ,194 ,265 ,277 ,132 ,161 
Negative -,279 -,335 -,129 -,071 -,094 -,163 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,974 1,169 ,937 ,981 ,466 ,577 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,299 ,130 ,344 ,291 ,982 ,894 
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2007 Tenure & MTBV      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
MTBV07 Low diversity 28 28,86 808,00  
High diversity 26 26,04 677,00  
Total 54      
MTBV08 Low diversity 28 30,30 848,50  
High diversity 26 24,48 636,50  
Total 54      
MTBV09 Low diversity 28 30,02 840,50  
High diversity 26 24,79 644,50  
Total 54      
MTBV10 Low diversity 28 29,68 831,00  
High diversity 26 25,15 654,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10  
Mann-Whitney U 326,000 285,500 293,500 303,000  
Wilcoxon W 677,000 636,500 644,500 654,000  
Z -,658 -1,359 -1,221 -1,056  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,511 ,174 ,222 ,291  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  MTBV07 MTBV08 MTBV09 MTBV10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,179 ,286 ,258 ,190 
Positive ,104 ,036 ,011 ,055 
Negative -,179 -,286 -,258 -,190 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,656 1,049 ,948 ,696 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,783 ,221 ,330 ,718 
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2007 Tenure & ROA      
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks  
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks  
ROA07 Low diversity 28 31,79 890,00  
High diversity 26 22,88 595,00  
Total 54      
ROA08 Low diversity 28 29,71 832,00  
High diversity 26 25,12 653,00  
Total 54      
ROA09 Low diversity 28 31,50 882,00  
High diversity 26 23,19 603,00  
Total 54      
ROA10 Low diversity 28 30,61 857,00  
High diversity 26 24,15 628,00  
Total 54      
      
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa  
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10  
Mann-Whitney U 244,000 302,000 252,000 277,000  
Wilcoxon W 595,000 653,000 603,000 628,000  
Z -2,077 -1,073 -1,939 -1,506  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)   ,038 ,283 ,053 ,132  
      
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa 
  ROA07 ROA08 ROA09 ROA10 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,275 ,242 ,321 ,245 
Positive ,000 ,107 ,036 ,071 
Negative -,275 -,242 -,321 -,245 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,009 ,888 1,180 ,898 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,261 ,410 ,123 ,396 
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Tenure & MTVB 2009    
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
MTBV_09 Low diversity 24 25,17 604,00 
High diversity 30 29,37 881,00 
Total 54     
MTBV_10 Low diversity 24 25,50 612,00 
High diversity 30 29,10 873,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10   
Mann-Whitney U 304,000 312,000   
Wilcoxon W 604,000 612,000   
Z -,975 -,836   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,330 ,403   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  MTBV_09 MTBV_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,208 ,200  
Positive ,058 ,067  
Negative -,208 -,200  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,761 ,730  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,609 ,660  
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Tenure & ROA 2009     
Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks 
  
Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
ROA_09 Low diversity 24 26,83 644,00 
High diversity 30 28,03 841,00 
Total 54     
ROA_10 Low diversity 24 22,54 541,00 
High diversity 30 31,47 944,00 
Total 54     
     
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa   
  ROA_09 ROA_10   
Mann-Whitney U 344,000 241,000   
Wilcoxon W 644,000 541,000   
Z -,279 -2,072   
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,781   ,038   
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statisticsa  
  ROA_09 ROA_10  
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,208 ,367  
Positive ,183 ,042  
Negative -,208 -,367  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,761 1,339  
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,609 ,055  
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10.11 Appendix K - Index correlation  
Correlations 2005 
      Index Age Gender Education Tenure 
Spearman's rho Index Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,518
**
 ,385
**
 ,287
*
 ,559
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,000 ,005 ,041 ,000 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
Age Correlation Coefficient ,518
**
 1,000 -,132 ,109 -,144 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 . ,356 ,447 ,312 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
Gender Correlation Coefficient ,385
**
 -,132 1,000 ,006 ,113 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,005 ,356 . ,964 ,430 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
Education Correlation Coefficient ,287
*
 ,109 ,006 1,000 -,111 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,041 ,447 ,964 . ,437 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
Tenure Correlation Coefficient ,559
**
 -,144 ,113 -,111 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,312 ,430 ,437 . 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
Correlations 2007 
      Index Age Gender Education Tenure 
Spearman's rho Index Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,390
**
 ,488
**
 ,207 ,648
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,004 ,000 ,133 ,000 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Age Correlation Coefficient ,390
**
 1,000 ,019 -,006 -,116 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,004 . ,889 ,968 ,402 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Gender Correlation Coefficient ,488
**
 ,019 1,000 -,082 ,115 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,889 . ,553 ,406 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Education Correlation Coefficient ,207 -,006 -,082 1,000 ,069 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,133 ,968 ,553 . ,618 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Tenure Correlation Coefficient ,648
**
 -,116 ,115 ,069 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,402 ,406 ,618 . 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Correlations 2009 
      Index Age Gender Education Tenure 
Spearman's rho Index Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,595
**
 ,516
**
 ,279
*
 ,592
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . ,000 ,000 ,041 ,000 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Age Correlation Coefficient ,595
**
 1,000 ,146 ,229 -,026 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 . ,292 ,096 ,851 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Gender Correlation Coefficient ,516
**
 ,146 1,000 ,039 ,091 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,292 . ,778 ,513 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Education Correlation Coefficient ,279
*
 ,229 ,039 1,000 -,151 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,041 ,096 ,778 . ,274 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
Tenure Correlation Coefficient ,592
**
 -,026 ,091 -,151 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,851 ,513 ,274 . 
N 54 54 54 54 54 
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10.12 Appendix L - Validity test of performance measures 
 
  
Datastream 
ROA 
Calculated 
ROA 
Datastream 
MTBV 
Calculated 
MTBV 
ABB 9,29% 9,50% 2,53 2,84 
Hennes & Mauritz 31,79% 31,96% 6,22 8,13 
Hufvudstaden -1,57% -1,70% 1,14 0,95 
NCC 4,90% 4,21% 0,66 1,16 
Swedbank 0,73% 3,11% 0,31 0,78 
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